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Abstract Transmission faults allow us to reason about per-
manent and transient value faults in a uniform way. However,
all existing solutions to consensus in this model are either
in the synchronous system, or require strong conditions for
termination, that exclude the case where all messages of a
process can be corrupted. In this paper we introduce even-
tual consistency in order to overcome this limitation. Even-
tual consistency denotes the existence of rounds in which
processes receive the same set of messages. We show how
eventually consistent rounds can be simulated from even-
tually synchronous rounds, and how eventually consistent
rounds can be used to solve consensus. Depending on the
nature and number of permanent and transient transmission
faults, we obtain different conditions on n, the number of
processes, in order to solve consensus in our weak model.
Keywords Consensus · Transmission faults · Arbitrary
faults · Static and dynamic faults · Transient and permanent
faults · Eventual consistency
1 Introduction
Consensus is probably the most fundamental problem in
fault-tolerant distributed computing. It is related to the imple-
mentation of state machine replication, atomic broadcast,
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group membership, etc. The problem is defined over a set
of processes Π , where each process p ∈ Π has an initial
value vi , and requires that all processes agree on a common
value.
Classical approach: Component fault model. Most research
on consensus algorithms is considering component fault
models, where faults are attached to a component that is either
a process or a link. With respect to process/link faults, con-
sensus can be considered with different fault assumptions. On
the one end of the spectrum, processes/links can commit so
called benign faults (processes fail only by crashing and links
only loose messages); on the other end, faulty processes/links
can exhibit an arbitrary behavior. Furthermore, in the context
of a component fault model, faults are mainly permanent (as
opposed to transient faults): if a process or link commits a
fault, the process/link is considered to be faulty during whole
execution. It follows that not all components can be faulty (at
most f out of n per run), which is referred to as static faults
(as opposed to dynamic faults that can affect any component).
Most research on consensus is about tolerating perma-
nent and static process and/or link faults. While processes
and links can be considered faulty, most of the literature con-
siders only process faults. In the context of Byzantine faults,
where at most f processes can behave arbitrarily, we can cite
the early work of Lamport, Shostak and Pease [17,22] for a
synchronous system. Consensus in a partially synchronous
system with Byzantine faults is considered in [2,12,21,25].
Byzantine variants of Paxos [18] include [1,10,15,19,20].
Only few authors solve consensus in the synchronous sys-
tem model where, in addition to Byzantine processes, a small
number of links connecting correct processes may be arbi-
trary faulty during the entire execution of a consensus algo-
rithm [24,28,30]. However, only a very limited number of
links can be faulty.
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There are two major problems of a priori blaming some
component for the failure [11,26,27]. First, it may lead
to undesirable consequences if faults are permanent: for
example, in the classical Byzantine fault model, where a
bounded number of processes can behave arbitrarily (even
maliciously), the entire system will be considered faulty even
if only one message from each process is received corrupted.
Second, when solving consensus, faulty processes are typi-
cally not obliged to make a decision or they are allowed to
decide differently than correct processes.
Some work in the component fault model has addressed
transient and dynamic faults [5]. These papers solve consen-
sus in the hybrid fault model for synchronous systems, where
every process is allowed to commit up to f sal arbitrary send
link failures and experience up to f ral arbitrary receive link
failures without being considered as arbitrary faulty. Tolerat-
ing additional fs send and fr receive omissions (i.e., message
loss) requires to increase the number of processes by small
multiples of fs and fr .
Finally, note that when a process q receives a corrupted
message from p, it makes no difference for q whether p is
faulty and therefore sends a message that was not consistent
with the protocol, or the message is corrupted by the link
between p and q. Actually, for q these two cases are indis-
tinguishable. Nevertheless, these two cases are not equivalent
in the component fault model.
Alternative approach: Transmission fault model. These
observations led to the definition of the transmission fault
model that captures faults without blaming a specific com-
ponent for the fault [26]. The transmission fault model is
well-adapted to dynamic and transient faults.
Consensus under transmission faults in a synchronous
system has been considered initially in [26]. In [11], this
work combined with ideas from [14], is extended to non-
synchronous systems with only benign transmission faults,
leading to the Heard-Of Model (HO model). The paper
gives several consensus algorithms under benign transmis-
sion faults.
In [4], the HO model for benign faults is extended to
value faults. There, consensus under transmission faults (both
benign and value faults) is solved the first time in a non-
synchronous setting.
For safety, only the number of corrupted messages is
restricted, that is, in each round r of the round based model,
every process p receives at most α corrupted messages.1
However, for liveness, some additional assumptions are nec-
essary, namely rounds in which some subset of processes
does not receive any corrupted messages.2 This means that,
1 This assumption potentially allows corrupted messages on all links
in a run; therefore it models dynamic faults.
2 This assumption makes sense in the context of transient faults.
despite the possibility to handle dynamic and transient value
faults in a non-synchronous system, [4] cannot tolerate per-
manent faults located at a process p, where all messages
from p might be (always) corrupted.
This raises the following question: is it possible to design a
consensus algorithm in the general transmission fault model,
with non-synchronous assumptions, that does not require
such a strong condition for liveness?
Transmission faults: Our contribution. We give a positive
answer to the above question by presenting three consensus
algorithms for transmission faults (both benign and value
faults) that do not exclude permanent faults.3 The key insight
in achieving this goal is the introduction of the notion of even-
tual consistency that turns out to be fundamental building
block for solving consensus under transmission faults. Infor-
mally speaking, for round-based algorithms, eventual con-
sistency denotes the existence of rounds in which processes
receive the same set of messages.
Our three algorithms are inspired by well-known consen-
sus algorithms [10,12,20] for the classical Byzantine fault
model [17], which we have adapted to the transmission fault
model. All three algorithms require a round in which con-
sistency eventually holds (processes receive the same set of
messages). This round is used to bring the system in the uni-
valent configuration, and later rounds are used to “detect”
that the system entered a univalent configuration and allows
processes to decide. So the key is to achieve eventually con-
sistent rounds. This is the most important contribution. We
show that eventually consistent rounds can be simulated from
eventually synchronous rounds in the presence of both static
and dynamic value faults. The benefits of our approach are
the following:
– First, contrary to most of the related work on transmission
faults and on the hybrid fault model (where both processes
and links can be arbitrary faulty), which considers the
synchronous system model, our consensus algorithms can
also be used in systems, where synchrony assumptions
hold only eventually.
– Second, contrary to the algorithms in [4], our algorithms
can also be used in systems with permanent faults located
at a process p, where all messages from p might be
(always) corrupted.
– Third, by considering the transmission fault model, the
algorithms can tolerate dynamic and transient value faults
in addition to only permanent and static faults of the com-
ponent fault model. As we explain in Sect. 10, considering
(only) transmission faults allows a variety of interpreta-
tions, making it possible to apply our algorithms to a vari-
3 We give three algorithms in order to show the generality of our
approach.
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ety of system models: partially synchronous system with
Byzantine processes, partially synchronous system with
Byzantine processes eventually restricted to ”symmetri-
cal faults” [29], partially synchronous system with Byzan-
tine processes, where, before stabilization time, in every
round processes can receive some (bounded) number of
corrupted messages from correct processes, etc.
Remark. Note that despite the similarity in title, [3] addresses
a different topic. The paper investigates the possibility of
designing protocols that are both self-stabilizing and fault-
tolerant in an asynchronous system. A self-stabilizing dis-
tributed algorithm is an algorithm that, when started in an
arbitrary state, guarantees to converge to a legitimate state
and then forever remains in a legitimate state. Solving one-
shot consensus, which is the subject of our paper, is impossi-
ble in the context of self-stabilization, because a process can
start in any state, i.e., its first step can be decide(v), where
v is an arbitrary value.
In the model considered in our paper, (transmission) faults
do not corrupt the initial configuration (the system starts in a
pre-defined state) but may disturb the execution of the proto-
col. Therefore, the protocols presented in this paper cannot
deal with an arbitrary initial configuration.
Organization of the paper. The rest of the paper is structured
as follows. We describe the transmission fault model we con-
sider in Sect. 2. The consensus problem is defined in Sect. 3.
In Sects. 4 and 5 we introduce the communication predicates
that we consider in the paper, including eventual consistency.
Section 6 shows how to simulate eventual consistency under
weak communication predicates, while Sect. 7 shows how to
solve consensus with eventual consistency. In Sect. 8 we dis-
cuss in detail the combination of one of the consensus algo-
rithms and the eventual consistency simulation. As we show
in Sect. 9, eventual consistency can be achieved also directly
with authentication. In Sect. 10 we argue that Byzantine faults
and permanent value faults located at a process are indistin-
guishable, and thus our algorithms also work (but not only)
in a partial synchronous model with Byzantine processes. We
conclude the paper in Sect. 11.
2 Model
We use a slightly extended version of the round-based model
of [4]. In this model, we reason about faults only as trans-
mission faults, without looking for a “culprit” for the fault
[4]. Therefore there are no “faulty” processes and no state
corruption in our model, but messages can be arbitrarily cor-
rupted (or lost) before reception. Nevertheless, as we explain
in Sect. 10, the model can be used to reason about classical
Byzantine faults.
Computations in this model are structured in rounds,
which are communication-closed layers in the sense that any
message sent in a round can be received only in that round.
As messages can be lost, this does not imply that the sys-
tems is synchronous. An algorithm A is specified by sending
function Srp and transition function T rp for each round r and
process p. We now give a formal definition of the round-
based model considered, and introduce the notions of (i) the
heard-of set HO(p, r), which captures synchrony and benign
faults, (ii) the safe heard-of set SHO(p, r), which handles
corruptions, i.e., captures communication safety properties,
and (iii) consistency CONS(r), which is true in round r , if
all processes receive the same set of messages at round r .
2.1 Heard-of sets and consistent rounds
Let Π be a finite non-empty set of cardinality n, and let M
be a set of messages (optionally including a null placeholder
indicating the empty message). To each p in Π , we associate
a process, which consists of the following components: A
set of states denoted by statesp, a subset ini tp of initial
states, and for each positive integer r called round number, a
message-sending function Srp mapping statesp to a unique
message from M, and a state-transition function T rp mapping
statesp and partial vectors (indexed by Π ) of elements of M
to statesp. The collection of processes is called an algorithm
on Π . In each round r , a process p:
1. applies Srp to the current state and sends the message
returned to each process,4
2. determines the partial vector µ rp, formed by the messages
that p receives at round r , and
3. applies T rp to its current state and µ rp.
The partial vector µ rp is called the reception vector of p at
round r .
Computation evolves in an infinite sequence of rounds. For
each process p and each round r , we introduce two subsets
of Π . The first subset is the heard-of set, denoted HO(p, r),
which is the support of µ rp, i.e.,
HO (p, r) =
{
q ∈ Π : µ rp[q] is defined
}
.
A process q is in the set HO(p, r) if p receives a message
from process p in round r . Note that the message received
may be corrupted. The second subset is the safe heard-of set,
denoted SHO(p, r), and defined by
SHO (p, r) =
{
q ∈ Π : µ rp[q] = Srq(sq)
}
,
4 W.l.o.g., the same message is sent to all. Because of transmission
faults, this does not prevent two processes p and q from receiving dif-
ferent messages from some process s.
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where sq is q’s state at the beginning of round r . A process
q is in the set SHO (p, r) if the message received by p is not
corrupted. In addition, for each round r , we define the consis-
tency flag, denoted CONS (r), which is true if all processes
receive the same set of messages in round r , i.e.,
CONS (r) = (∀p, q ∈ Π2 : µ rp = µrq).
From the sets HO(p, r) and SHO(p, r), we form the altered
heard-of set denoted AHO(p, r) as follows:
AHO (p, r) = HO (p, r)\SHO (p, r).
For any round r , and for any set of rounds Φ, we further
define the safe kernel of r resp. Φ:
SK (r) =
⋂
p∈Π
SHO (p, r) SK (Φ) =
⋂
r∈Φ
SK(r)
The safe kernel consists of all processes whose messages
were received correctly by all processes. We use also SK =
SK (N). Similarly, the altered span (of round r ) denotes the
set of processes from which at least one process received a
corrupted message (at round r ):
AS (r) =
⋃
p∈Π
AHO (p, r) AS =
⋃
r>0
AS (r)
We also extend the notion of CONS in a natural way to a set
Φ of rounds, i.e., CONS (Φ) = ∧r∈Φ CONS (r).
2.2 HO machines
A heard-of machine for a set of processes Π is a pair (A,P),
where A is an algorithm on Π , and P is a communication
predicate, i.e., a predicate over the collection
((HO (p, r), SHO (p, r))p∈Π , CONS (r))r>0
A run of an HO machine M is entirely determined by the ini-
tial configuration (i.e., the collection of process initial states),
and the collection of the reception vectors
(
µ rp
)
p∈Π, r>0.
2.3 Simulation of communication predicates
In the paper we will need to simulate5 communication pred-
icates P ′ using some HO machine M = (A,P). Intuitively,
in such a simulation, several rounds of M will be used to
simulate one round in which predicate P ′ holds. If the run
of M consists of k rounds, then algorithm A is a k round
simulation of P ′ from P .
5 The notion of a simulation differs from the notion of a translation
of the HO model for benign faults. A translation establishes a relation
purely based on connectivity, while with value faults, also some com-
putation is involved. Because of this, we decided thus to use the term
simulation instead.
Formally, let k be any positive integer, and let A be an
algorithm that maintains a variable m p∈M and Msgp ∈Mn
at every process p. We call macro-round ρ the sequence
of the k consecutive round k(ρ −1)+1, . . . , kρ. The vari-
able m p is an input variable that can be set externally in
every macro-round.6 The value of m p at the beginning of
macro-round ρ is denoted m(ρ)p , and the value of Msgp at
the end of macro-round ρ is denoted Msg(ρ)p . For the macro-
round ρ, we define in analogy to the definitions of Sect.
2.1:
HO (p, ρ) =
{
q ∈ Π : Msg(ρ)p [q] is defined
}
SHO (p, ρ) =
{
q ∈ Π : Msg(ρ)p [q] = m(ρ)q
}
CONS (ρ) = (∀p, q ∈ Π2 : Msg(ρ)p = Msg(ρ)q )
We say that the HO machine M = (A,P) simulates the
communication predicate P ′ in k rounds if for any run of M ,
the collection (HO (p, ρ), SHO (p, ρ))p∈Π, CONS (ρ))ρ>0
satisfies predicate P ′.
Given a simulation A of P ′ from P , any problem that
can be solved with P ′ by algorithm A′ can be solved with
P instead by simply simulating rounds of the algorithm A′
using algorithm A. In such a composed algorithm, the input
variable m(ρ)p of algorithm A is set at each macro-round ρ
to the value returned by the sending function of A′, and the
transition function of A′ is applied to the output Msg(ρ)p of
algorithm A.
3 Consensus
Let V be (non-empty) totally ordered set. In the consensus
problem every process p has an initial value ini tp ∈ V and
decides irrevocably on a decision value, fulfilling:
Integrity: If all processes have the same initial value
this is the only possible decision value.
Agreement: No two processes may decide differently.
Termination: All processes eventually decide.
Since, contrary to classical approaches, there is no deviation
according to T rp , and thus we do not have the notion of a
faulty process, the upper specification makes no exemption:
all processes must decide the initial value in the Integrity
clause, and all processes must make a decision by the Termi-
nation clause.
6 The sending function in a simulation algorithm is thus a function that
maps statesp and the input from M to a unique message from M;
while the state-transition function T rp is a function that maps statesp ,
the input from M, and a partial vector (indexed by Π ) of elements of
M to statesp .
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Formally, an HO machine (A,P) solves consensus, if any
run for which P holds, satisfies Integrity, Agreement, and
Termination. To make this definition non-trivial, we assume
that the set of HO and SHO collections for which P holds is
non-empty.
4 Communication predicates
In this section we introduce the communication predicates
that will be used in the paper. As already mentioned, we
reason about faults only as transmission faults. This allows
us to deal with both permanent and transient faults, but also
with static and dynamic faults.
4.1 Predicates that capture static and dynamic value faults
A dynamic fault is a fault that can affect any link in the
system—as opposed to static faults that affect the links of at
most f out of n processes per run [4]. We start with static
faults:
P fstat :: |AS| ≤ f (1)
with f ∈ N and N = {0, . . . , n}. Pstat is the name of the
predicate, and f is a free parameter. P fstat is a safety predi-
cate that models static faults, where corrupted messages are
received only from a set of f processes. In Sect. 10 we will
argue that such an assumption corresponds to a system with
at most f Byzantine processes.
For our algorithms we will also consider the weaker safety
predicate P fdyn (∀ f ∈ N , P fstat implies P fdyn) that restricts
the number of corrupted messages only per round and per
process:
P fdyn :: ∀r > 0,∀p ∈ Π : |AHO(p, r)| ≤ f
with f ∈ N and 0 ≤ f ≤ n. Predicate P fdyn potentially
allows corrupted messages on all links in a run, it therefore
models dynamic value faults.
4.2 Predicates that restrict asynchrony of communication
and dynamism of faults
Predicates Pstat and Pdyn only restrict the number of value
faults; however, it does not tell us anything about liveness
of communication. From [13] we know that we cannot solve
consensus in an asynchronous system if all messages sent by
one process may be lost. On the other hand, Santoro and Wid-
mayer [26] showed that consensus is impossible to solve in a
synchronous system if, at each time unit, there is one process
whose messages may be lost. Therefore, in order to solve
consensus we need to restrict asynchrony of communication
and dynamism of faults.
A synchronous system could be modeled as follows:
P fSK :: |SK | ≥ n − f
P fSK requires that there is a set of processes (safe kernel) of
size n − f whose messages are correctly received in every
round. From
∀ f ∈ N , P fSK ⇒ P fstat
it follows that P fSK implies static faults only. However, we
want to study consensus with dynamic faults. We consider
therefore the following predicate:
P f,kSK :: ∀r > 0 ∃ro > r, Φ = {r0, . . . , r0 + k − 1} :
|SK(Φ)| ≥ n − f
with f ∈ N and k > 0. This predicate (repeatedly) requires
a safe kernel of size n − f only eventually and only for k
rounds. It also restrict the dynamism of value faults during
these k round; i.e., corrupted messages can only be received
from at most f processes.
In the paper we will consider PSK always in conjunc-
tion, either with Pstat or Pdyn . When we assume PSK with
Pstat , i.e., P f,kSK ∧ P fstat , transmission value faults are static
(benign transmission faults are not restricted, so they can be
dynamic). On the other hand, when we assume PSK with
Pdyn , i.e., P f,kSK ∧ Pαdyn with f ≤ α, transmission value
faults are no more static: P f,kSK alone does not imply P f
′
stat
for any f ′ < n.
The implementation of the predicate PSK in a partially
synchronous system (in conjunction, either with Pstat or
Pdyn) is not discussed in this paper. The reader is referred to
[8,12].
4.3 Permanent versus transient faults
Both predicates, Pstat ∧ PSK and Pdyn ∧ PSK allow per-
manent faults. Consider for example a run and a process p,
where every process receives a corrupted message from p in
every round:
∀q ∈ Π, r > 0 : p ∈ SHO (q, r)
and all other messages are received correctly. Such a run
is included in the set of runs given by Pstat ∧ PSK and
Pdyn ∧ PSK , and thus the algorithms given later in the
paper can solve consensus in such a run. More precisely,
P fstat ∧ P fSK and P fdyn ∧ P fSK permits the existence of
up to f such processes. As pointed out in Sect. 10, this
allows our algorithms to solve consensus also, e.g., in clas-
sical models with Byzantine faults, an addresses the ques-
tion raised in the introduction. Indeed, this contrasts with
[4], where, although also Pdyn is considered (named Pα
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there), eventually there has to be a round, where a suffi-
ciently large subset of processes do not receive any cor-
rupted messages. There, (most) faults have to be tran-
sient.
5 Eventual consistency
In this section we introduce the notion of eventual consis-
tency that turns out to be a fundamental building block for
solving consensus under transmission value faults. Even-
tual consistency abstracts the major complexity present when
solving consensus under the weak communication predicates
presented above. Therefore eventual consistency allows us to
express consensus algorithms in a very concise and elegant
way.
Informally speaking, eventual consistency combines the
requirement of a consistent round (CONS (r) in our model)
with some requirements on liveness and safety of commu-
nication. It can be seen as an eventual version of inter-
active consistency [22]. In a component fault model, an
algorithm that solves interactive consistency allows cor-
rect processes to agree on a vector, where at least n − f
entries correspond to the initial values of the correspond-
ing correct processes ( f is the maximum number of faulty
processes).
Interactive consistency, when seen as a communication
primitive, can be captured by the following predicate:
P fI C ::|SK| ≥ n − f ∧ ∀r > 0 : CONS (r)
When we express the result of [22] in our model, their algo-
rithm allows a f + 1 round simulation of P fI C from P fSK if
n > 3 f . Note that ∀ f ∈ N , P fI C ⇒ P fstat .
Instead of PI C , we introduce a weaker predicate. We call
the predicate eventual consistency and define it as follows:
P fcons :: ∀r >0 ∃ro > r : |SK(r0)|≥n− f ∧ CONS (r0)
This predicate requires that there is always eventually a con-
sistent round with a safe kernel of size n − f . In contrast
to P fSK and PI C , this predicate requires these safe kernels
only eventually and then only for a single round. Also faults
are no more static: P fcons alone does not imply P f
′
stat for
any f ′ < n. Note that P fcons is a stronger predicate than
P f,1SK : although both predicates require a safe kernel of size
n− f and both restrict the dynamism of value faults for a sin-
gle round, P fcons in addition requires that consistency holds
during this round, i.e., for any two processes p and q we have
µp = µq .
However, Pcons can be simulated from PSK . In the next
section, we give two such simulations, and then establish the
link to solving consensus.
6 Simulating eventual consistency Pcons from
eventually safe kernels PSK
In this section we give two simulations of Pcons from PSK ,
one in the presence of only static value faults (Pstat ), and the
other in the presence of dynamic (and static) value faults
(Pdyn). As we show, the first simulation requires a smaller
number of processes in order to tolerate a given number of
transmission value faults. Then we introduce a generic pred-
icate Pcons⊕SK that can be simulated from PSK . The pred-
icate Pcons⊕SK , in conjunction with Pdyn or Pstat , is later
used in Sect. 7 to solve consensus.
6.1 Simulation in the presence of only static value faults
Algorithm 1 is a 3-round simulation of P fcons ∧ P fstat from
P3( f +1)SK ∧P fstat inspired by [10]. It ensures consistency dur-
ing a sequence of rounds where the size of the kernel is at least
n − f (the corrupted messages can be received only from at
most f processes). Moreover, it preserves P fstat , i.e., if P fstat
holds for basic rounds, then P fstat holds also for the macro-
rounds obtained by the 3-round simulation using Algorithm
1. It requires n > 3 f . As already mentioned in Sect. 2.3, a
simulation is an algorithm that maintains at each process p
two variables: an input variable m p that is set at the begin-
ning of every macro-round ρ (line 7), and an output variable
Msgp whose value is considered at the end of every macro-
round ρ (lines 24 and 26). The special value ⊥ represents the
case when a (reception) vector does not contain a message
from the respective process.
Algorithm 1 is a coordinator-based algorithm, where the
coordinator is chosen using a rotating coordinator strategy:
the coordinator of macro-round ρ is process ρmodn + 1; in
Algorithm 1 the variable coord refers to this process. We
describe Algorithm 1 from the point of view of the message
v2 that is sent by process p2 using Fig. 1. Assume that process
p1 is the coordinator. In round 3ρ − 2, process p2 sends the
message v2 to all. In rounds 3ρ − 1 and 3ρ of Algorithm 1,
the processes send messages that contain a vector of those
messages received in round 3ρ − 2. In this description we
focus only on those elements of the vectors that are related
to message v2 that is sent by process p2 in macro-round ρ.
In round 3ρ − 1, all processes send the value received from
p2 to all.7 The coordinator then compares the value received
from p2, say v2, in round 3ρ − 2 with the value indirectly
received from the other processes.
If at least 2 f + 1 values v2 have been received by the
coordinator p1, then p1 keeps v2 as the message received
from p2. Otherwise p1 sets the message received from p2
7 At line 16, the reception vector µrp is a vector of vectors: µrp[q ′] is
the vector p has received from q ′, and µrp[q ′][q] is element q of this
vector.
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Algorithm 1 Simulation of P fcons ∧P fstat from P f,3( f +1)SK ∧
P fstat
1: Initialization:
2: Msgp ← (⊥, . . . ,⊥) /* Msgp is the output variable */
3: /* ⊥ represents the absence of message */
4: coordp = ρmodn + 1
5: Round r = 3ρ − 2 :
6: Srp :
7: send m p to all
8: T rp :
9: receivedp ← µrp
10: Round r = 3ρ − 1 :
11: Srp:
12: send receivedp to all
13: T rp :
14: if p = coord then
15: for all q ∈ Π do
16: if
∣∣∣{q ′ ∈ Π : µrp[q ′][q] = receivedp[q]}
∣∣∣ < 2 f + 1
then
17: receivedp[q] ← ⊥
18: Round r = 3ρ :
19: Srp:
20: send 〈receivedp〉 to all
21: T rp :
22: for all q ∈ Π do
23: if (µrp[coordp][q] = ⊥) ∧∣∣∣{i ∈ Π : µrp[i][q] = µrp[coordp][q]}
∣∣∣ ≥ f + 1 then
24: Msgp[q] ← µrp[coordp][q]
25: else
26: Msgp[q] ← ⊥
Fig. 1 Algorithm 1 from the point of view of v2 sent by p2 (p1 is the
coordinator, n = 4, f = 1)
to ⊥ (line 17). This guarantees that if p1 keeps v2, then at
least f + 1 processes have received v2 from p2 in round
3ρ − 2. Finally, in round 3ρ every process sends the value
received from p2 in round 3ρ − 2 to all. The final value
adopted as message received from p2 at the end of round
3ρ (and therefore at the end of macro-round ρ) is computed
as follows at each process pi . Let vali be the value received
from coordinator p1 in round 3ρ. If vali = ⊥ then pi receives
⊥ from p2. Process pi receives ⊥ from p2 in another case:
if pi did not receive f + 1 values equal to vali in round 3ρ.
Otherwise, at least f + 1 values received by pi in round 3ρ
Fig. 2 How Algorithm 1 ensures P fcons : point of view of message sent
by p4 and received by p3. Process p1 is the coordinator, n = 4, f = 1,
only messages received from p4 can be corrupted
are equal to vali , and pi adopts vali as message received
from p2 in macro-round ρ.
Algorithm 1 relies on a coordinator for ensuring P fcons :
all processes assign to Msgp the value received from the
coordinator in round 3ρ (see line 24). This is achieved dur-
ing a macro-round in which the size of the safe kernel is
at least n − f , with the coordinator in the safe kernel. The
rotating coordinator strategy ensures the existence of such
a macro-round. Consider Fig. 2 that illustrates the mecha-
nism for ensuring consistency from the point of view of the
message sent by process p4 and received by process p3. The
coordinator adopts value v1 as the message sent by process
p4 in round 3ρ − 1 (line 16) since it is forwarded by 2 f + 1
processes. This ensures that the value v1 sent by the coordina-
tor in round 3ρ is also sent by at least f more processes from
the safe kernel in round 3ρ. Therefore, the value sent by the
coordinator satisfies the condition of line 23 at all processes
and is therefore assigned to Msgp[p4] by all processes at
line 24.
Using Fig. 3, we now explain how Algorithm 1 pre-
serves P fstat . Figure 3 considers message v2 sent by p2 and
received by p3; again, process p1 is the coordinator. Mes-
sages received from p2 in round 3ρ−2 are not corrupted, and
we show that the message received by p3 from p2 in macro-
Fig. 3 How Algorithm 1 preserves P fstat : point of view of v2 sent by
p2 and received by p3. Process p1 is the coordinator, n = 4, f = 1,
only messages received from p1 can be corrupted. Absence of arrows
represents message loss. Process p3 can only receive v2 or ⊥ from p2
(here ⊥)
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round ρ can only be v2 or ⊥. In round 3ρ, process p3 does
not “blindly” adopt the value received from the coordinator
(the message received can be corrupted). The value received
in round 3ρ from the coordinator is adopted by p3 only if the
same value is received from at least f additional processes
(line 23). This ensures that at least one such message is not
corrupted. In Fig. 3, process p3 adopts ⊥ as message received
from p2 in macro-round ρ, since it did not received f + 1
messages equal to value v′2 received from the coordinator.
Lemma 1 If n > 3 f then Algorithm 1 preserves P fstat .
Proof To avoid ambiguities, let in this proof ASρ = ⋃ρ>0
AS(ρ) denote the altered span with respect to macro-rounds
implemented by Algorithm 1, while AS = ⋃r>0 AS(r)
denotes the altered span with respect to the rounds of Algo-
rithm 1.
We need to show that |ASρ | ≤ f given that |AS| ≤ f . It is
thus sufficient to show ASρ ⊆ AS. Assume by contradiction
that there is a process p ∈ Π , a process s ∈ AS, and a
macro-round ρ so that s ∈ AHO(p, ρ), i.e., s sends message
m in macro-round ρ and p receives m′ = m.
Then, because of line 23, for Q = {q : µ3ρp [q][s] = m′}
we have |Q| ≥ f + 1. Because of |AS| ≤ f , there is a
i ∈ Q that has receivedi [s] = m′. Moreover, this implies
that µ3ρ−2i [s] = m′. Since s sent m, this is a contradiction to
s ∈ AS. unionsq
Lemma 2 If n > 3 f then Algorithm 1 simulates P fcons from
P f,3( f +1)SK .
Proof Let ρ denote a macro-round, let Φ = {3ρ − 2, 3ρ−
1, 3ρ
}
be the set of rounds of ρ, and let c0 = ρmodn + 1 be
the coordinator of ρ such that
c0 ∈ SK(Φ) ∧ |SK(Φ)| ≥ n − f.
Such a macro-round exists, because (i) P f,3( f +1)SK holds and
(ii) the coordinator is chosen using a rotating coordina-
tor scheme (the coordinator of macro-round ρ is process
ρmodn + 1).
We show that with Algorithm 1 (i) CONS(ρ) and (ii)
|SK(ρ)| ≥ n − f .
(i) Assume by contradiction that for two processes p and
q, Msg(ρ)p and Msg(ρ)q differ by the message of process
s ∈ Π , that is Msg(ρ)p [s] = Msg(ρ)q [s]. By round 3ρ, every
process adopts the value of c0 or sets Msg(ρ)[s] to ⊥; when
c0 ∈ SK(Φ) it follows that Msg(ρ)p [s] or Msg(ρ)q [s] is ⊥.
W.l.o.g. assume that Msg(ρ)p [s] = v and Msg(ρ)q [s] = ⊥.
For rounds r ∈ [3ρ − 1, 3ρ], let
Rrp(v, s) :=
{
i ∈ Π : µ rp[i][s] = v
}
represent the set of processes from which p receives v at
position s in round r. Similarly, for rounds r ∈ [3ρ − 1, 3ρ],
let
Qr (v, s) := {i ∈ Π : Sri (sri )[s] = v
}
represent the set of processes that sent v at position s in round
r.
By line 23, if Msg(ρ)p [s] = v, then |R3ρp (v, s)| ≥ f + 1,
and c0 ∈ R3ρp (v, s). Since c0 ∈ SK(Φ), we have c0 ∈
Q3ρ(v, s) and thus, by line 16, |R3ρ−1c0 (v, s)| ≥ 2 f + 1.
From this and |SK(Φ)| ≥ n − f , we have |R3ρ−1c0 (v, s) ∩
SK(Φ)| ≥ f + 1. Therefore, at least f + 1 processes p′
in SK(Φ), including c0, have receivedp′ [s] = v. It follows
that |R3ρq (v, s)| ≥ f + 1, and c0 ∈ R3ρq (v, s). This contra-
dicts the assumption that the condition in line 23 is false for
process q.
(ii) For every process p ∈ Π and q ∈ SK(Φ), by definition
we have receivedp[q] = mq at the end of round 3ρ − 2. In
round 3ρ − 1, c0 receives receivedq ′ [q] = mq from every
process q ′ ∈ SK(Φ), and thus there is no q ∈ SK(Φ) s.t. c0
sets receivedc0 [q] to ⊥ (*). In round 3ρ, since c0 ∈ SK (Φ),
every process p receives the message from c0. In addition,
since n > 3 f and |SK(Φ)| ≥ n − f , every process receives
the message from n − f > f + 1 processes in SK(Φ). By
(*) and line 23, for all processes p and all q ∈ SK(Φ), we
have Msgp[q] = mq .
Thus SK(Φ) ⊆ SK(ρ), which shows that |SK(ρ)| ≥ n −
f . unionsq
Corollary 1 If n > 3 f , Algorithm 1 is a simulation of
P fcons ∧ P fstat from P f,3( f +1)SK ∧ P fstat .
Remark 1 Algorithm 1 can easily be extended to preserve
also the following predicate:
|HO(p, r)| ≥ n − f
Intuitively, such an assumption is typical for algorithms that
are designed to work in a system with reliable channels. The
modified simulation algorithm then uses the reception vector
of the first round as Msg in case there would be less than f
elements in Msg. It is easy to show that this does not affect
Corollary 1, while preserving the above predicate. Since our
algorithms do not need this assumption, we do not detail this
extension further.
Remark 2 Interestingly there is also decentralized (i.e.,
coordinator-free) solution to this simulation. The algorithm
is presented in [7] in terms of Byzantine faults but can be
easily adapted to our framework. Such a simulation requires
f + 1 rounds. In some cases this approach can be beneficial
[6].
6.2 Simulation in the presence of dynamic value faults
In this section we show a simulation of Pcons from PSK and
the weaker predicate Pdyn that (partially) preserves Pdyn .
More precisely, we show a simulation from P fSK ∧Pαdyn into
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Algorithm 2 Simulation of P fcons ∧ Pβdyn from P f,4( f +1)SK ∧ Pαdyn
1: Initialization:
2: Msgp ← (⊥, . . . ,⊥) /* Msgp is the output variable */
3: coordp = ρmodn + 1
4: Round r = 4ρ − 3 :
5: Srp :
6: send m p to all /* m p is the input variable */
7: T rp :
8: f irstp ← µ rp
9: con f p ← (⊥, . . . ,⊥)
10: Round r = 4ρ − 2 :
11: Srp:
12: send f irstp to all
13: T rp :
14: for all q ∈ Π do
15: if
∣∣∣
{
i ∈ Π : µrp[i][q] = f irstp[q]
}∣∣∣ ≥ n − f then
16: con f p[q] ← f irstp[q]
17: Round r = 4ρ − 1 :
18: Srp :
19: send con f p to all
20: T rp :
21: if p = coordp then
22: for all q ∈ Π do
23: if
∣∣∣
{
i ∈ Π : µrp[i][q] = con f p[q]
}∣∣∣ < α + f + 1 then
24: con f p[q] ← ⊥
25: Round r = 4ρ :
26: Srp :
27: send con f p to all
28: T rp :
29: for all q ∈ Π do
30: if
∣∣∣
{
i ∈ Π : µ rp[i][q] = µ rp[coordp][q]
}∣∣∣ ≥ α + 1 then
31: Msgp[q] ← µrp[coordp][q]
32: else
33: Msgp[q] ← ⊥
Fig. 4 Algorithm 2 from the point of view of v2 sent by p2; p1 is the
coordinator, n = 4, f = 1
P fcons ∧Pβdyn with β ≥ α: the simulation may only partially
preserve Pαdyn in the sense that the number of corruptions
in the simulated rounds may increase from α to β ≥ α,
depending on n.
The simulation requires four rounds, as shown by Algo-
rithm 2. As we can see, β is not a parameter of the algo-
rithm. Fixing β leads to some requirement on n. More
precisely, given f, α ≥ f, β ≥ α, Algorithm 2 requires
n >
(β+1)(α+ f )
β−α+1 . Similarly to Algorithm 1, it is coordinator-
based.
The communication pattern of Algorithm 2 is very similar
to Algorithm 1 with the addition of one “all-to-all” round (see
Fig. 4, to be compared with Fig. 1). We explain Algorithm
2 from the point of view of the message sent by process p2.
In round 4ρ − 3, process p2 sends message v2 to all.8 In
round 4ρ − 2, all processes send to all the value received
from p2, and then compare the value v2 received from p2 in
8 Similar as in the description of Algorithm 1, in case of messages that
contain a vector of messages, we focus only on those elements of the
vectors that are related to the message sent by process p2.
Fig. 5 Algorithm 1 does not preserves Pαdyn ; from the point of view
of p2 and p3, that sends correspondingly v2 and v3 in round 3ρ − 2,
and reception of process p4 of messages sent by p2 and p3. n = 4,
f = α = β = 1 and p1 is coordinator. Message received by p4
from coordinator in round 3ρ is corrupted; other messages are correctly
received. Absence of arrows represents message loss
round 4ρ−3 with the value indirectly received from the other
processes in round 4ρ − 2. If at least n − f values v2 have
been received by process p, then p keeps v2 as the message
received from p2. Otherwise, the message received from p2
is ⊥ (line 9). As explained later, rounds 4ρ − 3 and 4ρ − 2
filter the values for rounds 4ρ − 1 and 4ρ in order to ensure
Pβdyn from Pαdyn . Rounds 4ρ − 1 and 4ρ are very similar to
rounds 3ρ − 1 and 3ρ in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 relies on a coordinator for ensuringP fcons : all
processes assign to Msgp the value received from the coor-
dinator in round 4ρ (see line 31). This is achieved during a
macro-round in which the size of the safe kernel is at least
n − f , with the coordinator in the safe kernel. Since consis-
tency is ensured under the same conditions as with Algorithm
1, we use exactly the same mechanism in Algorithm 2.
The additional complexity of Algorithm 2 comes from the
part responsible for ensuring Pβdyn . We start by explaining
on Fig. 5 why Algorithm 1 does not preserve Pαdyn for the
simplest case f = α = 1, n = 4. According to P1dyn , every
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Fig. 6 After round 4ρ − 3: two examples (left and right) of corrupted
values (represented by X)
Fig. 7 After round 4ρ−2: a two examples of vectors received by some
p j starting from Fig. 6 left; b two examples of vectors received by some
p j starting from Fig. 6 right (corrupted values are represented by ×)
process can receive at most one corrupted message per round.
In round 3ρ − 2, process p3 receives the corrupted message
v′2 from p2, and p4 receives the corrupted value v′3 from
p3. These values are sent to the coordinator p1 in round
3ρ −1. Finally, in round 3ρ, process p4 receives v′2, v′3 from
p1, v′2, v3 from p3, and v′3 from itself. Since there are f + 1
values equal to those sent by coordinator, p4 considers v′2,
respect. v′3, as messages received from p2, respect. p3, in
macro-round ρ, violating P1dyn . The problem comes from
the fact that dynamic faults have a cumulative effect, i.e.,
messages that are corrupted in round 3ρ−2 add to corrupted
messages from round 3ρ.
We now explain why the addition of round 4ρ − 2 allows
us to cope with this issue. Informally speaking, the role of
round 4ρ − 2 in Algorithm 2 is to transform dynamic faults
into some maximum number of static faults, i.e., into some
maximum number of faults localized at some fixed set of
processes. Consider rounds 4ρ − 3 and 4ρ − 2, with n = 4,
α = f = 1. In round 4ρ − 3, predicate Pαdyn ensures that,
in total, at most n · α = 4 corrupted values are received. In
other words, among the vectors f irstp1 to f irstp4 received
(line 8), at most n · α = 4 elements can be corrupted (see
Fig. 6, where × represents possible corrupted values). In
round 4ρ − 2, each process pi sends vector f irstpi to all
processes. Consider the reception of these four vectors by
some process p j . Since α = 1, one of these vectors can be
received corrupted at p j . Figure 7 shows four examples, two
starting from Fig. 6 left, two starting from Fig. 6 right.
To understand which value p adopts from q (lines 15 and
16) we need to look at column q in Fig. 7. From line 16, p
adopts a corrupted value from q only if column q contains at
least n − f = 3 corrupted values. In the upper case, no col-
umn satisfies this condition, i.e., p adopts no corrupted value.
In the lower case, columns 2 and 1 satisfy this condition, i.e.,
corrupted values can be adopted from p2 or p1. It is easy to
see that in the case n = 4, f = α = 1, corrupted values can
be adopted from at most one process. In other words, rounds
4ρ − 3 and 4ρ − 2 has transformed α = 1 dynamic fault
into at most β = 1 static faults. However, in the case n = 5,
f = α = 2, rounds 4ρ − 3 and 4ρ − 2 transform α = 2
dynamic fault into at most β = 3 static fault.
Transforming α dynamic faults into β ≥ α static faults
allows us to rely on the same mechanism as in Algorithm 1
for the last two rounds of the simulation. Note that in rounds
4ρ −1 and 4ρ of Algorithm 2 we have dynamic faults, while
in rounds 3ρ − 1 and 3ρ of Algorithm 1 faults were static.
Nevertheless the same mechanisms can be used in both cases.
Theorem 1 If n > (β+1)(α+ f )
β−α+1 , n > α+ f, α ≥ f , and β ≥
α, then Algorithm 2 simulates P fcons∧Pβdyn fromP f,4( f +1)SK ∧
Pαdyn.
The theorem follows directly from Lemmas 3 and 4: the
first lemma considers Pβdyn and Pαdyn , the second P fcons and
P f,4( f +1)SK .
Lemma 3 If n > (β+1)(α+ f )
β−α+1 and β ≥ α, then Algorithm 2
simulates Pβdyn from Pαdyn.
Proof We need to show that for every macro-round ρ, and
every process p, we have |AHO (p, ρ)| ≤ β, i.e., at most β
messages are corrupted.
Assume by contradiction that there is a process p so that
|AHO (p, ρ)| > β. That is, we have |S| ≥ β + 1 for
S = {s ∈ Π : Msgp[s] = ms and Msgp[s] = ⊥
}
For all s ∈ S, let m′s denote Msgp[s]. The output Msgp[s]
is set at line 31. Because of line 30, this implies that
∀s ∈ S :
∣∣∣
{
i ∈ Π : µ4ρp [i][s] = m′s
}∣∣∣ ≥ α + 1.
Because of |AHO(p, 4ρ)| ≤ α, at the end of round 4ρ − 1
we have
∀s ∈ S, ∃is ∈ Π : con fis [s] = m′s .
Since in round 4ρ − 1 the elements of con f can only be set
to ⊥, the same condition needs to holds also at the end of
round 4ρ − 2. Because of line 15, this implies
∀s ∈ S, ∃is ∈ Π, ∃Qs ⊆ Π, |Qs | ≥ n − f,∀q ∈ Qs :
µ
4ρ−2
is [q][s] = m′s .
123
Tolerating permanent and transient value faults 65
Because of |AHO(p, 2)| ≤ α, at the end of round 4ρ − 3 we
have
∀s ∈ S, ∃Q′s ⊆ Π, |Q′s | ≥ n − f − α :
∀q ∈ Q′s : f irstq [s] = m′s .
Note that f irstq = µ4ρ−3q . The number of tuples (q, s) such
that µ4ρ−3q [s] = m′s is thus at least (β +1)(n − f −α). From
this it follows that there is at least one process q0 where the
number of corrupted messages in the first round is
⌈
(β+1)(n− f −α)
n
⌉
=α+
⌈
(β+1)(n− f −α)−nα
n
⌉
> α,
where the last inequation follows from n > (β+1)(α+ f )
β−α+1 and
β ≥ α, which ensures (β+1)(n− f −α)−nα > 0. Therefore
AHO(q0, 4ρ − 3) > α, which contradicts the assumption
AHO(q0, 4ρ − 3) ≤ α. unionsq
Lemma 4 If n > α + f and α ≥ f , then Algorithm 2
simulates P fcons from P f,4( f +1)SK .
Proof Letρ denote a macro-round, letΦ ={4ρ − 3, . . . , 4ρ}
be the set of rounds of ρ, and let c0 = ρmodn + 1 be the
coordinator of ρ such that
c0 ∈ SK(Φ) ∧ |SK(Φ)| ≥ n − f.
Such a macro-round exists, because (i) P f,4( f +1)SK holds and
(ii) the coordinator is chosen using a rotating coordina-
tor scheme (the coordinator of macro-round ρ is process
ρmodn + 1). We show that with Algorithm 2 (i) CONS(ρ)
and (ii) |SK(ρ)| ≥ n − f .
(i) Assume by contradiction that for two processes p and
q, Msg(ρ)p and Msg(ρ)q differ by the message of process
s ∈ Π , that is Msg(ρ)p [s] = Msg(ρ)q [s]. By round 4ρ, every
process adopts the value of c0 or sets Msg(ρ)[s] to ⊥; when
c0 ∈ SK(Φ) it follows that Msg(ρ)p [s] or Msg(ρ)q [s] is ⊥.
W.l.o.g. assume that Msg(ρ)p [s] = v and Msg(ρ)q [s] = ⊥.
For rounds r ∈ [4ρ − 1, 4ρ], let Rrp(v, s) :={q ∈ Π :
µ rp[q][s] = v} represent the set of processes from which p
receivesv at position s. Similarly, for rounds r ∈ [4ρ−1, 4ρ],
let
Qr (v, s) :=
{
q ∈ Π : Srq(srq)[s] = v
}
represent the set of processes that sent v at position s.
By line 30, if Msg(ρ)p [s] = v, then |R4ρp (v, s)| ≥ α +
1, and c0 ∈ R4ρp (v, s). Since c0 ∈ SK(Φ), we have c0 ∈
Q4ρ(v, s) and thus, by line 23, |R4ρ−1c0 (v, s)| ≥ α + f + 1.
From this and |SK(Φ)| ≥ n − f , we have |R4ρ−1c0 (v, s) ∩
SK(Φ)| ≥ α + 1. Therefore, at least α + 1 processes p′
in SK(Φ), including c0, have con f p′ [s] = v. It follows that
|R4ρq (v, s)| ≥ α+1, and c0 ∈ R4ρq (v, s). This contradicts the
assumption that the condition in line 30 is false for process
q.
(ii) For every processes p ∈ Π and q ∈ SK(Φ), by defi-
nition we have f irstp[q] = mq at the end of round 4ρ − 3.
In round 4ρ − 2, for every process s ∈ SK(Φ), f irsts is
received. Therefore, by line 15 since |SK(Φ)| ≥ n − f ,
at every process p ∈ Π we have con f p[q] = mq , for all
q ∈ SK(Φ) (*). In round 4ρ−1, c0 receives con fq ′ [q] = mq
from every process q ′ ∈ SK(Φ), and thus there is no
q ∈ SK(Φ) s.t. c0 sets con fc0 [q] to ⊥ (**). In round 4ρ, since
c0 ∈ SK (Φ), every process p receives the message from c0.
In addition, since n ≥ f + α + 1 and |SK(Φ)| ≥ n − f ,
every process receives the message from n − f ≥ α + 1
processes in SK(Φ). By (*), (**) and line 30, for all processes
p and all q ∈ SK(Φ), we have Msgp[q] = mq . Thus
SK(Φ) ⊆ SK(ρ), which shows that SK(ρ) ≥ n − f . unionsq
Corollaries 2 and 3 follow from Lemma 3.
Corollary 2 If n > (α + 1)(α + f ), then Algorithm 2 pre-
serves Pαdyn.
By Corollary 2, preserving Pαdyn leads to a quadratic
dependency between n and α. Corollary 3 shows the surpris-
ing result that, allowing more than α corruptions in the sim-
ulated round, leads instead to a linear dependency between
n and α. Note that the simulation mentioned in Corollary 3
is not useful if
⌊
η
η−1α
⌋
≥ n.
Corollary 3 For any η ∈ R, η > 1, if n > η(α + f ), then
Algorithm 2 simulates P
⌊
η
η−1 α
⌋
dyn from Pαdyn.
Proof Let ξ = η
η−1 . From ξα > ξα − 1 = α ηη−1 − 1 =
αη−η+1
η−1 it follows that
ξα+1
ξα−α+1 < η. The corollary follows
from Lemma 3 by setting β = ξα. unionsq
6.3 Generic predicate
In Sect. 7 we solve consensus using the following generic
predicate, which combines Pcons and PSK :
P f,b,kcons⊕SK :: ∀φ > 0, ∃φ0 ≥ φ,
CONS ((φ0 − 1)k+1) ∧ |SK (Φ)|≥n − f,
where Φ = {(φ0 − 1)k + 1 − b, . . . , φ0k}
It defines a phase with k rounds, where the first round of
some phase φ0 is consistent and all rounds of phase φ0 plus
the preceding b rounds have safe kernel of size at least equal
to n − f .
Obviously, Pcons⊕SK can be simulated from PSK and
Pstat using Algorithm 1, and from PSK and Pdyn using
Algorithm 2. In both cases, Algorithms 1 or 2 simulate the
first round of a phase, and a trivial simulation (where mes-
sages are just delivered as received) are used for the other
rounds. Ensuring that the coordinator is in the safe kernel
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requires f +1 phases. In case of Algorithm 1, the first macro-
round of a phase requires 3 rounds, and the others k −1 only
1 round. Therefore f +1 phases correspond to (k+2)( f +1)
rounds. This leads to:
Corollary 4 If n > 3 f , then P f,b,kcons⊕SK ∧P fstat can be sim-
ulated from P f,KSK ∧P fstat , where K = (k + 2)( f + 1)+ b +
(k + 1).
Note that the additional term k + 1 for K stems from the
fact that the rounds with a safe kernel are not necessarily
aligned to the phases of P f,b,kcons⊕SK . In case of Algorithm 2,
since the first macro-round requires 4 rounds, we have:
Corollary 5 If n > (β+1)(α+ f )
β−α+1 , n > α + f, α ≥ f , and
β ≥ α, then P f,b,kcons⊕SK ∧Pβdyn can be simulated from P f,KSK ∧
Pαdyn, where K = (k + 3)( f + 1) + b + (k + 2).
Here the additional alignment term in K is k + 2.
7 Solving consensus with eventual consistency
In this section we use the generic predicate Pcons⊕SK to
solve consensus. In all consensus algorithms below, the nota-
tion #(v) is used to denote the number of messages received
with value v, i.e.,
#(v) ≡
∣∣∣
{
q ∈ Π : µrp[q] = v
}∣∣∣ .
7.1 The BOTR algorithm
We start with the simplest algorithm, namely the BOTR
algorithm. The basic technique of this algorithm is that a
value that is decided is locked in the sense that a sufficiently
high quorum of processes retain this value as estimate. A
similar algorithmic scheme can be found in algorithms for
benign [9,11,16,23] and arbitrary [4,20] faults.
The code of BOTR is given as Algorithm 3. It consists of
a sequence of phases, where each phase φ has two rounds
Algorithm 3 The BOTR algorithm
1: Initialization:
2: votep ← ini tp ∈ V
3: Round r = 2φ − 1 :
4: Srp :
5: send votep to all
6: T rp :
7: if |H O(p, r)| ≥ T then
8: votep ← min
{
v : ∃v′ ∈ V s.t. #(v′) > #(v)}
9: Round r = 2φ :
10: Srp:
11: send votep to all
12: T rp :
13: if ∃v¯ = ⊥ : #(v¯) ≥ T then
14: Decide v¯
2φ − 1 and 2φ. Every process p maintains a single variable
votep initialized to p’s initial value. In every round, every
process p sends votep to all. In round 2φ − 1, if a process p
receives at least T messages then it updates votep, and sets
votep to the smallest most often received value of the current
round. In round 2φ, if a process p receives at least T times
the same value v then it decides on v.9
We will show that BOTR is safe (in the sense that it fulfills
integrity and agreement) for appropriate choices of T when
Pαdyn holds (or Pαstat , since Pαstat implies Pαdyn). The value of
threshold T is chosen such that if some process decides v at
line 14 of round r , then in any round r ′ ≥ r , at all processes
only v can be assigned to any vote, and hence only v can be
decided. Termination is achieved in both cases if in addition
the following predicate holds:
P fBOT R :: ∀φ,∀p, ∃φ0 > φ :
CONS(2φ0−1) ∧ |HO(p, 2φ0−1)| ≥ n− f
∧(∃φ1 ≥ φ0 : |SHO(p, 2φ1)| ≥ n − f )
The P fBOT R predicate ensures the existence of phases φ0 and
φ1 ≥ φ0 such that: (i) in the first round of phase φ0 processes
receive the same set of at least n − f messages, and (ii) in
the second round of phase φ1 processes receive at least n − f
uncorrupted messages.
Obviously, P f,0,2cons⊕SK implies P fBOT R . Eventual consis-
tency ensures the first part of the predicate, namely the exis-
tence of a consistent round 2φ0 − 1 where in addition every
process receives enough messages. This guarantees that at the
end of round 2φ0 − 1 all processes adopt the same value for
votep. The second part of the predicate forces every process
to make a decision at the end of round 2φ1.
7.1.1 Correctness of the BOTR algorithm
First we introduce some piece of notation. For any variable x
local to process p, we denote x (r)p the value of x p at the end
of round r . For any value v ∈ V and any process p, at any
round r > 0, we define the sets Rrp(v) and Qrp(v) as follows:
Rrp(v) :=
{
q ∈ Π : µ rp[q] = v
}
Qrp(v) :=
{
q ∈ Π : Srq(p, sq) = v
}
.
where sq denotes q’s state at the beginning of round r . The
set Rrp(v) (resp. Qrp(v)) represents the set of processes from
which p receives v (resp. which ought to send v to p) at
round r . Since at each round of the consensus algorithm,
every process sends the same message to all, the sets Qrp(v)
9 The two rounds of BOTR algorithm can be merged in a single round
in which the code of both state-transition functions is executed at once.
We have split them in two rounds to emphasize on the different com-
munication predicates required.
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do not depend on p, and so can be just denoted by Qr (v)
without any ambiguity.
We start our correctness proof with a general basic lemma:
Lemma 5 For any process p and any value v, at any round
r, we have:
|Rrp(v)| ≤ |Qr (v)| + |AHO(p, r)|
Proof Suppose that process p receives a message with value
v at round r > 0 from process q. Then, either the code
of q prescribes it to send v to p at round r , i.e., q belongs
to Qr (v) and thus q is also in SHO(p, r), or the message
has been corrupted and q is in AHO(p, r). It follows that
Rrp(v) ⊆ Qr (v) ∪ AHO(p, r), which implies |Rrp(v)| ≤
|Qr (v)| + |AHO(p, r)|. unionsq
As an intermediate step to argue agreement, our next
lemma introduces a condition on T that ensures no two
processes can decide differently at the same round:
Lemma 6 If T > n2 + α then in any run of the HO machine〈B OT R,Pαdyn〉 there is at most one possible decision value
per round.
Proof Assume by contradiction that there exist two processes
p and q that decide on different values v and v′ in some round
r > 0. From the code of BOTR, we deduce that |Rrp(v)| ≥ T
and |Rrq(v′)| ≥ T . Then Lemma 5 ensures that |Qr (v)| ≥
T − |AHO(p, r)| and |Qr (v′)| ≥ T − |AHO(q, r)|.
Since each process sends the same value to all at each
round r , the sets Qr (v) and Qr (v′) are disjoint if v and v′
are distinct values. Hence |Qr (v) ∪ Qr (v′)| = |Qr (v)| +
|Qr (v′)|. Then from T > n2 + α and since Pαdyn holds, we
have |AHO(p, r)| ≤ α and |AHO(q, r)| ≤ α. Therefore, we
derive that |Qr (v)∪Qr (v′)| > 2(T−α) > n, a contradiction.
unionsq
The next lemma shows that once a sufficently high num-
ber of processes have the same vote, no other value will be
adopted in later rounds by any process:
Lemma 7 If T > 23 (n + 2α), then in any run of the HO
machine 〈B OT R,Pαdyn〉, if |{p′ ∈ Π : vote(r−1)p′ = v}| ≥
T − α, every process q that updates its variable voteq at
round r sets it to v.
Proof Since vote is only updated in the first round of a phase,
it sufficies to consider the case r = 2φ − 1. Since q updates
voteq in round r , because of line 13, |HO(q, r)| ≥ T . Let
Qr (v¯) denote the set of processes that, according to their
sending functions, ought to send messages different from
v at round r , and let Rrq(v¯) denote the set of processes
from which q receives values different from v at round r .
Since each process sends a message to all at each round,
Qr (v¯) = Π\Qr (v), and thus |Qr (v¯)| = n − |Qr (v)|.
Similarly, we have Rrq(v¯) = HO(q, r)\Rrq(v), and since
Rrq(v) ⊆ HO(q, r), it follows that |Rrq(v¯)| ≤ T − Rrq(v).
Because of the assumption of the Lemma, and the fact that
processes send their current value of vote in every round, we
have |Qr (v)| ≥ T −α. It follows that |Qr (v¯)| ≤ n−(T −α).
With an argument similar to the one used in the proof of
Lemma 5, we derive that |Rrq(v¯)| ≤ |Qr (v¯)| + |AHO(q, r)|.
Therefore, we obtain |Rrq(v¯)| ≤ n − T + α + |AHO(q, r)|.
Since Pαdyn holds, it follows that |Rrq(v¯)| ≤ n −T +2α. It
follows that because of T > 23 (n + 2α), we have |Rrq(v¯)| <
1
3 (n + 2α), and therefore |Rrq(v)| > |Rrq(v¯)|. This implies
that v is the most frequent value received by q at round r .
Then the code entails q to set voteq to v. unionsq
We now extend the statement of Lemma 7 to hold also for
any phase φ > φ0:
Lemma 8 If T > 23 (n + 2α), then in any run of the HO
machine 〈B OT R,Pαdyn〉 such that process p decides some
value v at some phase φ0 > 0, every process q that updates
its variable voteq at some phase φ > φ0 necessarily sets it
to v.
Proof Assume process p decides value v at round r0 = 2φ0
of phase φ0. We prove by induction on r that:
∀r ≥ r0, |{q ∈ Π : vote(r−1)q = v}| ≥ T − α.
Then Lemma 7 ensures this Lemma.
Basic case: r = r0. Since p decides v at round r0, then
|Rr0p (v)| ≥ T . By Lemma 5, we have |Qr0(v)| ≥ T −α when
Pαdyn holds. From the code of BOTR, we have Qr0(v) = {q ∈
Π : vote(r0−1)q = v}, and so the basic case follows.
Inductive step: r > r0. Assume |{q ∈ Π : vote(r−1)q =
v}| ≥ T −α. Lemma 7 ensures that for any process q, voteq
is updated only to v. Thus |{q ∈ Π : vote(r)q = v}| ≥ |{q ∈
Π : vote(r−1)q = v}| ≥ T − α. unionsq
With the help of the previous lemmas, we can show the
agreement clause of consensus:
Proposition 1 (Agreement) If T > 23 (n + 2α), then there
is at most one possible decision value in any run of the HO
machine 〈BOTR,Pαdyn〉.
Proof Let φ0 be the first phase at which some process p
makes a decision, and let v be p’s decision value. Assume
that process q decides v′ at phase φ. By definition of φ0, we
have φ ≥ φ0.
We proceed by contradiction, and assume that v = v′.
Since T > n2 + α, by Lemma 6, we derive that φ > φ0.
Since p decides v at round 2φ0 and q decides v′ at round 2φ,
Lemma 5 ensures that |Q2φ0(v)| ≥ T − |AHO(p, 2φ0)| and
|Q2φ(v′)| ≥ T − |AHO(q, 2φ)|.
123
68 Z. Milosevic et al.
Since T > 23 (n +2α), Lemma 8 implies that Q2φ0(v) and
Q2φ(v′) are disjoint sets. Therefore,
|Q2φ0(v) ∪ Q2φ(v′)| = |Q2φ0(v)| + |Q2φ(v′)|.
Because of T > 23 (n +2α), we have |Q2φ0(v)∪ Q2φ(v′)| >
n, which is a contradiction. unionsq
Now we show that the HO machines 〈BOTR,Pαdyn〉 satis-
fies the integrity clause of consensus for T > 2α.
Proposition 2 (Integrity) If T > 2α, then in any run of the
HO machine 〈BOTR,Pαdyn〉 where all the initial values are
equal to some value v0, the only possible decision value is
v0.
Proof Consider a run of the HO machine 〈BOTR,Pαdyn〉 such
that all the initial values are equal to v0.
First, by induction on r , we show that:
∀r > 0 : Qr (v0) = Π
Note that according to the code of BOTR, p belongs to
Qr (v0) if and only if vote(r−1)p = v0, and so Qr (v0) =
{p ∈ Π : vote(r−1)p = v0}.
Basic case: r = 1. All the initial values are equal to v0.
Therefore, every process sends a message with value v0 at
round 1.
Inductive step: r > 1. Suppose that Qr−1(v0) = Π . Let
p be a process that updates its variable x p at round r − 1.
Since AHO(p, r − 1) ≤ α, each process p receives at most
α values distinct from v0 at round r − 1. Therefore, either p
does not modify votep at the end of round r which remains
equal to v0, or p receives at least T messages at round r , and
thus at least T − α messages with value v0 and at most α
values different from v0. In the latter case, p sets votep to
v0 since T > 2α. This shows that definitely, vote(r−1)p = v0.
Therefore, Qr (v0) = Π .
Let p be a process that makes a decision at some round
r0 > 0. We have just shown that Qr0(v0) = Π . When
|AHO(p, r0)| ≤ α holds, p receives at most α messages
with value different to v0. Since T > α, the code entails p
to decide v0 at round r . unionsq
For liveness, as already stated the communication pred-
icate P fBOT R ensures that (i) voteq are eventually identi-
cal, and (ii) each process then hears of sufficiently many
processes to make a decision.
Proposition 3 (Termination) If n > 4α+3 f and T > 23 (n+
2α), then any run of the HO machine 〈BOTR,P fBOT R∧Pαdyn〉
satisfies the Termination clause of consensus.
Proof Since n > 4α + 3 f , we have n − f ≥ T . By
P fBOT R , there exists a phase φ0 such that for all processes p|HO(p, 2φ0 − 1)| ≥ n − f ∧ CONS(2φ0 − 1). Therefore,
in round 2φ0 − 1, for any two processes p and q, we have
µ
2φ0−1
p = µ2φ0−1q , and |HO(p, 2φ0−1)∩HO(q, 2φ0−1)| ≥
n − f ≥ T . The code of BOTR algorithm (see line 8) implies
that for all processes p at the end of round 2φ0 − 1 we have
votep set to the same value v0.
Because of T > 23 (n +2α), a similar argument as the one
used in Lemma 8 shows that every process q that updates
voteq at round r ′ > r0 definitely sets it to v0. Moreover, from
P fBOT R we have ∀p ∈ Π, ∃φ1 ≥ φ0 s.t. |SHO(p, 2φ1)| ≥
n− f ≥ T . Therefore, there exist a round 2φ1 such that every
process p in Π eventually receives at least T messages with
value v0 at round 2φ1, and so decides v0. unionsq
Combining Propositions 1, 2, and 3, we get the following
theorem:
Theorem 2 If n > 4α + 3 f and T > 23 (n + 2α), then the
HO machine 〈BOTR,P fBOT R ∧ Pαdyn〉 solves consensus.
Similar reasoning can be used to show:
Corollary 6 If α = f, n > 5 f and T > 23 (n + f ), then the
HO machine 〈BOTR,P fBOT R ∧ Pαstat 〉 solves consensus.
7.2 The BLV algorithm
The next algorithm we present is called BLV . It is based on
the last voting mechanism [11] that was first introduced in the
seminal Paxos algorithm by Lamport [18] for benign faults.
This mechanism is also at the core of the PBFT algorithm by
Castro and Liskov [10], the Byzantine variant of the Paxos
algorithm.
BLV is designed to work both under Pαstat and Pαdyn . It
requires n > 2(α + f ) and T > n2 + α in the presence
of dynamic value faults (Pαdyn), or n > 3 f , α = f , and
T > n+ f2 if value faults are only static (Pαstat ). Termination
is achieved with Pαdyn or Pαstat if in addition the following
predicate holds:
P fBLV :: ∀φ > 0, ∃φ0 > φ : CONS(3φ0 − 2)
∧∀r ∈ {3φ0 − 2, . . . , 3φ0} : |SK (r)| ≥ n − f
The P fBLV predicate ensures the existence of a phase φ0 such
that: (i) in the first round of φ0 processes receive the same
set of messages, and (ii) in all three rounds of φ0 processes
receive at least n − f uncorrupted messages.
Obviously, P f,0,3cons⊕SK implies P fBLV . Eventual consis-
tency ensures that at the end of round 3φ0 − 2, all processes
select the same value. The condition that there exists a large
enough safe kernel in phase φ0 finally forces every process
to make a decision at the end of round 3φ0.
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Algorithm 4 BLV algorithm
1: Initialization:
2: votep ← ini tp ∈ V
3: tsp ← 0
4: histor yp ←
{
(ini tp, 0)
}
5: Round r = 3φ − 2 :
6: Srp :
7: send 〈votep, tsp, histor yp〉 to all
8: T rp :
9: selectp ← FBLVT,α(µrp)
10: if selectp = null then
11: histor yp ← histor yp ∪
{
(selectp, φ)
}
15: Round r = 3φ − 1 :
16: Srp:
17: if ∃(v, φ) ∈ histor yp then
18: send 〈v〉 to all
19: T rp :
20: if #(v) ≥ T then
21: votep ← v
22: tsp ← φ
23: Round r = 3φ :
24: Srp:
25: if tsp = φ then
26: send 〈votep〉 to all
27: T rp :
28: if ∃v¯ = ⊥ : #(v¯) ≥ T then
29: Decide v¯
The code of BLV is given as Algorithm 4. It consists
of a sequence of phases, where each phase φ has three
rounds 3φ − 2, 3φ − 1 and 3φ. The last voting mecha-
nism uses a timestamp variable ts in addition to to the vari-
able vote. Whenever a process p updates votep in round
3φ − 1, tsp is set to φ (line 21 and 22). If enough processes
update vote in round 3φ − 1, then a decision is possible in
phase 3φ. This is the same mechanism as in Paxos. Note
the condition at line 20. It ensures that in round 3φ − 1, all
processes that update vote, update it to the same value. As
in Paxos, this ensures that in round 3φ, processes attempt
to decide on one single value, which is necessary for agree-
ment.
In order to deal with value faults, BLV maintains also a
history variable, which stores pairs (v, φ). Having (v, φ) ∈
historyp means that p added (v, φ) to historyp in phase
φ (line 11). The history variable ensures that a corrupted
message with invalid values for vote and tsp will not affect
the safety properties of the algorithm. It is mainly used
in round 3φ − 2, which has two roles, the first related to
agreement and integrity, and the second related to termina-
tion:
1. Safety role:
(a) Agreement: If a process p has decided v in some
phase φ0, then for any process q, only v can be
assigned to selectq at line 9 in phases φ > φ0.
(b) Integrity: If all process have the same initial value v,
then only v can be assigned to selectp at line 9.
2. Termination role: In a consistent round with safe kernel
of size n − f , all processes must assign the same value
to select at line 9.
Line 9 refers to the selection function FBLVT,α , which
takes as input the messages received in round 3φ − 2. We
explain now this function (Algorithm 5):
– Line 30 (together with line 31) ensures 1a. More pre-
cisely, it ensures selection of the most recent vote in
the history of some process. This is basically the same
mechanism as in Paxos, adapted to transmission value
faults. Selecting the most recent vote among the set
of majority processes can be expressed in Paxos as
follows:
mostRecentV ←
{
(v, ts) : (v, ts) ∈ µrp ∧
|{q : µrp[q] = (v′, ts′) ∧ ts ≥ ts′)}| >
n
2
}
In Paxos, this selection rule ensures agreement since most
recent vote is a single value. In BLV, a corrupted mes-
sage can contain (vote, ts) with ts equal to the highest
timestamp of a process, but with a different vote. There-
fore, the above selection rule does not ensure 1a, since
several values can satisfy the condition of lines 30 and 31.
The solution consists in transforming condition ts ≥ ts′
into (v = v′ ∧ ts = ts′)∨ ts > ts′ and using a higher
threshold (T > n2 + f or T > n+ f2 ).
Algorithm 5 Function FBLVT,α(M)
30: possibleV ← {(v, ts) : ∃i ∈ Π : (v, ts) = M[i] ∧ ∣∣{q : M[q] = (v′, ts′,−) ∧ ((v = v′ ∧ ts = ts′) ∨ ts > ts′)}∣∣ ≥ T }
31: con f irmedV ← {v : (v, ts) ∈ possibleV ∧ |{q : M[q] = (−,−, histor y) ∧ (v, ts) ∈ histor y}| > α }
32: if |con f irmedV | ≥ 1 then
33: return min(con f irmedV )
34: else if {q : M[q] = (−, 0,−)} ≥ T then
35: return minimal v, such that ∃(v, 0,−) ∈ M and  ∃(v′, 0,−) ∈ M s.t. #((v′, 0,−)) > #((v, 0,−))
36: else
37: return null
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With this, if a process has previously decided v¯, then only
v¯ can be in con f irmedV .10
– Line 31 prevents from returning a value v from a pair
(v, ts) that is from a corrupted message: the pair must
be in the history of at least one process. Therefore, a
pair (v, ts) is considered only if it is part of the history
in at least α + 1 messages received. Together with line
30, it also ensures 1b: when all processes have the same
initial value, no other value is in the historyp variable of
processes.
We consider now lines 32 and 33 of Algorithm 5. As we
just explained, if a process has previously decided v¯, then
only v¯ can be in con f irmedV , that is, |con f irmedV | = 1.
In this case, by line 33, the function FBLVT,α returns v¯. If no
correct process has decided, we can have |con f irmedV | >
1. In this case, if some round 3φ − 2 is a consistent round
with safe kernel of size n − f , then all processes consider
the same set con f irmedV , which ensures 2. Lines 34 and 35
are for the case where not all processes have the same initial
value. Termination would be violated without these lines.
7.2.1 Correctness of the BLV algorithm
In this section we use the same definition of R(v) and Q(v)
as in Sect. 7.1.1.
Definition 1 A value v is locked in a phase φ by process p
if votep = v and tsp = φ at the end of round 3φ − 1.
Lemma 9 If T > n2 +α, then in any run of the HO machine
(BLV,Pαdyn) there is at most one locked value per phase.
Proof Assume by contradiction that there exist two processes
p and q that lock different values v and v′ in some phase
φ0 > 0. From line 20 we deduce that |R3φ0p (v)| ≥ T
and |R3φ0q (v′)| ≥ T . Then Lemma 5 (note that this lemma
holds also for BLV) ensures that |Q3φ0(v)| ≥ T − α and
|Q3φ0(v′)| ≥ T − α when Pαdyn holds.
Since each process sends the same value to all at each
round, the sets Q3φ0(v) and Q3φ0(v′) are disjoint if v and v′
are distinct values. Hence,
|Q3φ0(v) ∪ Q3φ0(v′)| = |Q3φ0(v)| + |Q3φ0(v′)| ≥ 2T −2α.
10 Consider two phases φ0 and φ0 + 1, such that a process has decided
v¯ in phase φ0. We consider the more general case in the presence of
dynamic faults, and we assume that n = 5, f = α = 1 and T = 4. This
means that at least T − α = 3 processes have ts = φ0 and vote = v¯.
Consider in phase φ0 + 1 that (v, ts) ∈ possibleVp at p with v = v¯.
This means that p, in round 3(φ0+1)−2, has received T = 4 messages
with either (v, ts,−), or (−, ts′,−) and ts′ < ts. Since n = 5 and
T = 4, at least one of these messages is from a process c such that
votec = v¯ and tsc = φ0. Since v = v¯, we must have φ0 < ts. However,
in phase φ0 +1, no process p can have (v, ts) with ts > φ0 in histor yp .
Therefore, by line 31, we will not have v ∈ con f irmedV .
Consequently, since T > n2 + α, we derive that |Q3φ0(v) ∪
Q3φ0(v′)| > n, a contradiction. unionsq
Lemma 10 If T > α, then in any run of the HO machine
(BLV,Pαdyn) there is at most one possible decision value per
phase.
Proof Assume by contradiction that there exist two processes
p and q that decide on different values v and v′ in some
phase φ0 > 0. From line 28 we deduce that |R3φ0p (v)| ≥ T
and |R3φ0q (v′)| ≥ T . Then Lemma 5 and Pαdyn ensure that
|Q3φ0(v)| ≥ T − α and |Q3φ0(v′)| ≥ T − α.
Since each process sends the same value to all at each
round, the sets Q3φ0(v) and Q3φ0(v′) are disjoint since v and
v′ are distinct values. Hence, when T > α, the sets Q3φ0(v)
and Q3φ0(v′) are not empty, and so by line 25, there exist
two processes p′ and q ′ that have votep′ = v, tsp′ = φ0,
voteq ′ = v′ and tsq ′ = φ0. A contradiction with Lemma 9.
unionsq
Lemma 11 If T > n2 +α, then in any run of the HO machine
(BLV,Pαdyn), if process p decides v in phase φ0 > 0, then
for all later phases φ > φ0 and all processes q, (v, φ) is the
only pair that can be added to historyq .
Proof Assume by contradiction that φ1 > φ0 is the first
phase where a pair (v1, φ1) with v1 = v is added to the
historyq at process q. This implies that if history at some
process contains a pair (v′, φ′) with v′ = v, then φ′ ≤ φ0
(*).
Since by our assumption q added (v′,−) to histor yq in
phase φ1, this implies that FBLVT,α returns v′ at line 9
in phase φ1. Therefore, either (i) line 33 or (ii) line 35 of
Algorithm 5 was executed by q in phase φ1.
In case (ii), the condition of line 34 has to be true. This
implies that |R3φ1−2q ((−, 0,−))| ≥ T , and thus, by Lemma
5, |Q3φ1−2((−, 0,−))| ≥ T − α.
We prove an intermediate result: In phases φ such that
φ0 ≤ φ < φ1, we have |{q ∈ Π : vote3φ−1q =
v ∧ ts3φ−1q ≥ φ0}| ≥ T − α. Since p decides v in
phase φ0, |R3φ0p (v)| ≥ T , and thus by Lemma 5, we
have |Q3φ0(v)| ≥ T − α. From the code of the BLV
algorithm, we have Q3φ0(v) = {q : vote3φ0−1q =
v ∧ ts3φ0−1q = φ0}, therefore the claim holds for phase
φ0.
We now show that any process that locked value v
in phase φ0 (see Definition 1) and updates vote in
phase φ such that φ0 < φ < φ1, sets it to v. This
ensures the claim. Assume by contradiction that one of
these processes q ′ sets voteq to v′ in round 3φ − 1.
By line 20, |R3φ−1q (v′)| ≥ T . Then Lemma 5 ensures
that |Q3φ−1(v′)| ≥ T − α. Since T > α, we have
|Q3φ−1(v′)| > 0, i.e. at least one process sent v′ at
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line 17. Therefore, by line 17 at least one process has
(v′, φ0+1) in history, a contradiction with the assump-
tion that φ1 is the first phase where a pair (v′,−) is
added to history at some process.
So we have also |⋃ts≥φ0 Q3φ1−2((v, ts,−))| ≥ T −α. Since
in each round, every process sends the same value to all, and
φ0 > 0, the sets X (v) = ⋃ts≥φ0 Q3φ1−2((v, ts,−)) and
Q3φ1−2((−, 0,−)) are disjoint. Hence,
|X (v) ∪ Q3φ1−2((−, 0,−))| =
|X (v)| + |Q3φ1−2((−, 0,−))| ≥ 2T − 2α.
Together with T > n2 + α, we derive that |
⋃
ts≥φ0 Q3φ1−2
((v, ts,−)) ∪ Q3φ1−2((−, 0,−))| > n, a contradiction.
In case (i), the condition at line 32, has to be true, i.e.,
v′ need to be part of con f irmedV set at line 31. Value v′
can be part of the set con f irmedV only if (v′, ts′) is part of
the set possibleV at line 30. We show that if (v′, ts′) is part
of the set possibleV at line 30, v′ cannot be part of the set
con f irmedV at line 31, which establishes the contradiction.
If the pair (v′, ts′) is added to the set possibleV at
line 30, then HO(q, 3φ1 − 2) ≥ T . Since 2T − α >
n + α, |HO(q, 3φ1 − 2)∩ ⋃ts≥φ0 Q3φ1−2((v, ts,−))| > α.
Therefore, since Pαdyn holds, any set of messages of size T
contains at least one message m with m.vote = v and m.ts ≥
φ0 (**). So we have |{m′ ∈ µrq : (m′.ts < ts′)}| ≥ T and,
because of (**), ts′ > φ0.
The value v′ is added to the set con f irmedV at line 31
only if there are at least α+1 messages m in µ3φ−2q such that:
(v, φ) ∈ m.history and φ ≥ ts′ and v = v′. Since ts′ > φ0,
by (*), q receives at most α such messages, a contradiction.
unionsq
Proposition 4 (Agreement) If T > n2 + α, then no two
processes can decide differently in any run of the HO machine
(BLV,Pαdyn).
Proof Let a phase φ0 > 0 be the first phase at which some
process p makes a decision, and let v be the p’s decision
value. Assume that process q decides v′ at phase φ′. By def-
inition of φ0, we have φ′ ≥ φ0.
We proceed by contradiction and assume that v = v′.
By Lemma 10, we derive that φ′ > φ0. Since q decides at
round 3φ′, by line 28 we have |R3φ′q (v′)| ≥ T . By Lemma
5, we have |Q3φ′(v′)| ≥ T − α. Since T > α, there is at
least one process p′ that sends v′ in round 3φ′. By line 25
and line 22 we have that process p′ sends it’s current vote in
round 3φ′ only if vote is updated in round 3φ′−1. Therefore,
|R3φ′−1p′ (v′)| ≥ T , i.e. by Lemma 5, we have |Q3φ
′−1(v′)| ≥
T −α. Since T > α, at least one process q ′ sends v′ in round
3φ′ − 1. By line 17, if q ′ sends v′ in round 3φ′ − 1, then
∃(v′, φ′) ∈ history3φ′−2q ′ , a contradiction with Lemma 11.unionsq
Lemma 12 If T > 2α, then in any run of the HO machine
(BLV,Pαdyn) where all the initial values are equal to some
value v, for all processes q, historyq contains only pairs
(v,−).
Proof Since all processes have v as their initial value,
history at all processes is initialized to (v, 0). Assume by
contradiction that φ0 is the first phase where a pair (v′,−) is
added to historyp at some process p (*). This implies that
FBLVT,α returns v′ at line 9. Therefore, either (i) line 33 or
(ii) line 35 of Algorithm 5 was executed by p in phase φ0.
For (i), the condition at line 32 has to be true, i.e., v′
needs to be in con f irmedV at line 31. This means that p
received more than α messages m = (−,−, historym) with
(v′, ts) ∈ historym in round 3φ0−2. By Lemma 5 and Pαdyn ,
at least one process sends a message m = 〈−,−, histor ym〉
with (v′, ts) ∈ historym in round 3φ0 − 2, a contradiction
with (*).
For (ii), the condition of line 34 has to be true. If this
condition is true, this implies that |HO(p, 3φ0 − 2)| ≥ T .
Since T > 2α, Pαdyn holds, and all processes have the same
initial value v, v is returned at line 35 and (v, φ0) is added
to the historyp. A contradiction. unionsq
Proposition 5 (Integrity) If T > 2α, then in any run of the
HO machine (BLV,Pαdyn) where all the initial values are
equal to some value v, the only possible decision value is v.
Proof By contradiction, assume that phase φ0 > 0 is the first
phase in which some process p decides v′ = v.
Since p decides at round 3φ0, by line 28 we have
|R3φ0p (v′)|≥T . By Lemma 5 and Pαdyn , we have |Q3φ0(v′)| ≥
T −α. Since T > α, there is at least one process q that sends
v′ in round 3φ0. By line 25 and line 22, we have that process q
sends it’s current vote in round 3φ0 only if vote is updated in
round 3φ0 −1. Therefore, |R3φ0−1q (v′)| ≥ T , i.e., by Lemma
5 and Pαdyn , we have |Q3φ0−1(v′)| ≥ T −α. Since T > α, at
least one process q ′ sends v′ in round 3φ0 − 1. By line 17, if
q ′ sends v′ in round 3φ0 −1, then ∃(v′, φ0) ∈ history3φ0−2q ′ ,
a contradiction with Lemma 12. unionsq
Proposition 6 (Termination) If n > 2( f + α), T > n2 + α
and f ≤ α, then any run of of the HO machine (BLV,Pαdyn∧
P fBLV ) satisfies the Termination clause of consensus.
Proof By P fBLV , there exists a phase φ0 such that
CONS(3φ0 − 2) ∧ ∀r ∈ {3φ0 − 2, . . . , 3φ0} :
SK (r) ≥ n − f.
Therefore, in round 3φ0−2, for any two processes p and q, we
have µrp = µrq , and |SHO(p, 3φ0 −2)∩SHO(q, 3φ0 −2)| ≥
n − f .
Part A. We now prove that select3φ0−2p will be the same at
all processes p, i.e., that FBLVT,α returns the same value at
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all processes, and all processes add the same pair to history
in round 3φ0 − 2. There are two cases to consider: (i) some
process p ∈ SK(φ0) locked a value in some phase smaller
than φ0, or (ii) there is no such process in SK(φ0).
Case (i): Let φ < φ0 be the largest phase in which some
process p locked some value v (line 21). By Lemma 9 and
since Q > n2 + α, all processes that lock a value in phase φ,
lock the same value v. Since n > 2( f + α) and T > n2 + α,
n− f ≥ T ; therefore in case (i) at least a pair (v,−) is added
to the set possibleV at line 30 of Algorithm 5 (*).
We consider now line 31 of Algorithm 5. If p locked value
v in phase φ, then |R3φ−1p (v)| ≥ T , i.e., by Lemma 5, we have
|Q3φ−1(v)| ≥ T −α when Pαdyn holds. Because of line 17 of
Algorithm 4, at least T −α processes have (v, φ) in history.
By assumption, n > 2( f + α) and T > n2 + α, therefore
n − f + T > n + α. Therefore, because of |SK(φ0)| ≥
n− f , any set of messages received in round 3φ0−2 contains
more than α messages m with (v, φ) ∈ m.history. Since
n > 2( f + α) and T > n2 + α, n − f ≥ T (***), and
therefore v is added to the set con f irmedV at line 31 of
Algorithm 5 (**).
From (*) and (**), it follows that the condition of line 32
of Algorithm 5 is true at all processes in phase φ0. Moreover,
since functionFBLVT,α is deterministic and CONS(3φ0−2)
holds, for any two processes p and q, we have selectp =
selectq at line 9. Therefore p and q add the same pair to
history at line 11.
Case (ii): By hypothesis, for all processes p ∈ SK(φ0),
we have tsp = 0. By (***) n − f ≥ T and therefore the
condition at line 34 of Algorithm 5 is true at each process.
Moreover, by CONS(3φ0 −2) we have for any two processes
p and q µrp = µrq . Therefore, the value returned at line 35 of
Algorithm 5 is the same at all processes, and they will add
the same pair to history at line 11 of Algorithm 4.
Part B. From Part A, there exists a value v such that at all
processes p we have (v, φ0) ∈ historyp at the beginning of
round 3φ0 − 1. Therefore all processes send v to all at line
26. By |SK(3φ0 − 1)| ≥ n − f we have that all processes
receive at least n− f messages equal to v, and since by (***)
n − f ≥ T , they all set votep to v (line 21) and send v to all
at line 26. By |SK(3φ0)| ≥ n − f and the same reasoning we
can show that all processes receive n − f messages equal to
v in round 3φ0, and since by (***) n − f ≥ T , decide v at
line 29 in phase φ0. unionsq
Combining Propositions 4, 5, and 6, we get the following
theorem:
Theorem 3 If n > 2(α + f ) and T > n2 + α, then the HO
machine 〈BLV,P fBLV ∧ Pαdyn〉 solves consensus.
Similar reasoning can be used to show:
Theorem 4 If α = f, n > 3 f and T > n+ f2 , then the HO
machine 〈BLV,P fBLV ∧ Pαstat 〉 solves consensus.
Note that the BLV algorithm can also be used in the model
considered in [4], where all faults are transient. By Theo-
rem 3, the BLV algorithm solves consensus in this model if
n > 2α ( f = 0), in contrast to algorithm AT,E in [4], which
requires n > 4α. Algorithm UT,E,α in [4] requires n > 2α
but, contrary to BLV , requires for safety that in every round
every process receives a sufficient number of correct mes-
sages. This is not required by BLV , which is still correct
even if processes do not receive any correct message in some
rounds.
7.3 The BL K algorithm
The third algorithm we present is called BL K . It is based on
locking/unlocking mechanism that was first introduced in the
seminal consensus algorithm for benign and arbitrary faults
given by Dwork, Lynch and Stockmayer [12].
It requires n > 2(α + f ) and T > n2 + α in the pres-
ence of dynamic value faults (Pαdyn), or n > 3 f , α = f and
T > n+ f2 if value faults are only static (Pαstat ). The code
of BL K is given as Algorithm 6. It consists of a sequence
Algorithm 6 BL K algorithm
1: Initialization:
2: votep ← ini tp ∈ V
3: tsp ← 0
4: histor yp ← ∅
5: Round r = 3φ − 2 :
6: Srp :
7: send 〈votep, ini tp〉 to all
8: T rp :
9: selectp ← FBLKT (µrp)
10: if selectp = null then
11: histor yp ← histor yp ∪
{
(selectp, φ)
}
12: Round r = 3φ − 1 :
13: Srp :
14: if ∃(v, φ) ∈ histor yp then
15: send 〈v〉 to all
16: T rp :
17: if #(v) ≥ T then
18: votep ← v
19: tsp ← φ
20: Round r = 3φ :
21: Srp :
22: send 〈votep, tsp, histor yp〉 to all
23: T rp :
24: if ∃v¯ = ⊥ : #(〈v¯, φ,−〉) ≥ T then
25: Decide v¯
26:
if((∃〈v′, ts, −〉 ∈ µrp s.t. votep = v′ ∧ ((ts > tsp)∨ tsp = 0)
and
(|{m : m ∈ µrp ∧ (v′, ts) ∈ m.histor y}| > α)) or
(received at least T 〈 v, 0, −〉 s.t.
 ∃v : |〈v, 0,−〉| > α) then
27: votep ← None
28: tsp ← 0
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Algorithm 7 Function FBLKT (M)
1: validV ← {m.vote s.t. m ∈ M and |m′ ∈ M s.t. m′.vote = m.vote or m′.vote = None| ≥ T }
2: if |validV | > 0 then
3: if None ∈ validV then
4: return minimal v, such that ∃(−, v) ∈ M and  ∃(−, v′) ∈ M s.t. #((−, v′)) > #((−, v))
5: else
6: return min(validV )
7: else
8: return null
of phases, where each phase φ has three rounds 3φ − 2,
3φ − 1, and 3φ. In addition to the variable vote, and sim-
ilarly to BLV , the algorithm maintains a timestamp ts and
a history variable. In round 3φ − 2, every process p sends
〈votep, ini tp〉 to all, where ini tp is p’s initial value. It is
maybe surprising to see that also the initial value ini tp is
sent in the first round. The initial value is used only when
votep = None, as can be seen in the selection function
FBLKT (Algorithm 7). A value selected in round 3φ − 2
(lines 9 and 15) is sent to all in round 3φ−1. If in round 3φ−1,
a process p receives at least T messages equal to some value
v, it sets votep to v and tsp to φ (lines 18 and 19). Then we say
that process p locked value v in phase φ. If votep = None
then process p has not locked any value. In round 3φ, a
process p sends 〈votep, tsp, historyp〉 to all processes. If
some value v is locked in phase φ by sufficiently high quo-
rum of processes, then a decision is possible in phase φ
(line 24).
A value can be unlocked by process p in round 3φ, if p
learns that some process q locked different value in higher
phase (tsq > tsp ∧ voteq = votep). In addition to vote and
ts, BL K maintains the history variable, which stores pairs
(v, φ). Having (v, φ) ∈ historyp means that p selected v in
round 3φ − 2 and added (v, φ) to historyp in phase φ (line
11). It is used to filter out corrupted pairs (vote, ts) at round
3φ.
It can be shown, using similar technique as for BLV , that
BL K is safe (it fulfills integrity and agreement) for appro-
priate choice of T when Pαdyn holds (or Pαstat , since Pαstat
implies Pαdyn). Termination is achieved in both cases if in
addition the following predicate holds:
P fBL K :: ∀φ > 0, ∃φ0 > φ : CONS(3φ0 − 2)
∧∀r ∈ {3φ0 − 3, . . . , 3φ0} : |SK (r)| ≥ n − f
The P fBL K predicate ensures the existence of a phase φ0 such
that: (i) in the first round of φ0 processes receive the same set
of messages, (ii) in all three rounds of φ0 processes receive
correctly messages from at least n − f processes, and (iii)
in the last round of phase φ0 − 1 processes receive at least
n − f uncorrupted messages.
Obviously, P1,3gen implies P fBL K . Eventual consistency
ensures that at the end of round 3φ0 − 2, all processes set
selectp to the same value. P fBL K also ensures a large enough
safe kernel in the last round of the previous phase φ0 −1. The
role of this round is to ensure that all processes either lock
the same value (those with the highest timestamp), or they
do not lock any value. The condition that there exists a large
enough safe kernel in phase φ0 finally forces every process
to make a decision at the end of round 3φ0.
The proof of correctness follows a similar pattern as for
BLV and is not repeated here.
BLK versus BLV. There are strong similarities between BLV
and BLK: three rounds per phase, only round 3φ − 2 must
eventually be a consistent round, the history variable. How-
ever, the mechanisms for agreement differ: BLV uses a last
voting mechanism, while BLK employs a locking mecha-
nism. The two mechanisms are used in round 3φ − 2, when
assigning a value to select (line 9):
– The last voting mechanism uses vote and ts (mechanism
of PBFT and Paxos).
– The locking mechanism uses only vote (mechanism
introduced in [12]).
This difference has consequences in the information sent in
round 3φ−2: in BLV, 〈votep, tsp, historyp〉 is sent; in BLK,
only 〈votep, ini tp〉 is sent. The initial value is only needed
when several correct processes do not have a locked value
(vote = None) as can be seen in Algorithm 7 (see line 3 and
4).
To illustrate the difference between the two mechanisms,
consider the case with dynamic value faults where n =
5, α = f = 1, T = 4 and some process p1 has decided v1
at the end of phase φ1. A possible configuration of processes
p1 to p5 for the two algorithms at the end of phase φ1 is the
following:
(v1, φ1), (v1, φ1), (v1, φ1)(v2, φ2), (v2, φ2)
where each tuple represents the states (vote, ts) and φ2 <
φ1.11 The history at T − α = 3 processes contains the pair
(v1, φ1). In round 3(φ1 + 1) − 2 of the BLV algorithm, let
11 Process p1 decided v1 by receiving correctly messages from
processes p1,p2 and p3 and the corrupted message 〈v1, φ1,−〉 from
p4.
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a process p2 receive, from processes p1 to p5 (the message
received from process p5 is corrupted):
(v1, φ1,−), (v1, φ1,−), (v1, φ1,−), (v2, φ2,−),
(v2, φ1,−).
With the last voting mechanism, we have v1 ∈ con f irmedV
(there are 4 messages with vote = v1 or ts < φ1 and
(v1, φ1) is in history of the message sent by three processes),
and selectp is set to v1. Assume that similarly, in round
3(φ1+1)−2 of the BLKalgorithm, process p2 receives, from
processes p1 to p5 (all messages are correctly received):
(v1,−), (v1,−), (v1,−), (v2,−), (v2,−).
With the locking mechanism, validV in Algorithm 7 is
empty (there are no four messages with vote = v1), and
null is returned. With the locking mechanism, processes p1,
p2 and p3 have “locked” v1, while processes p4 and p5 has
“locked” v2. It is clear that as long as processes p4 and p5
have locked v2, no additional process can decide. Therefore,
an unlocking mechanism is needed. This is the role of lines
26 and 28 of Algorithm 6. If process p4 receives a message
(v, ts,−) from a process with (v, ts) in history of α+1 mes-
sages received, and votep4 = v, tsp4 < ts, then process p4
unlocks votep4 by setting the variable to None (line 28). The
second part of condition at line 26 is for the case where not
all processes have the same initial value (termination would
be violated without it). Now in round 3(φ1 + 1) − 2, let a
process receive, from processes p1 to p5:
(v1,−), (v1,−), (v1,−), (None,−), (v2,−).
This leads to have v1 ∈ validV , and selectp is set to v1.
Observe that the unlocking mechanism requires historyp
(line 22). Therefore, we can also summarize the two mech-
anisms by saying that the last voting mechanism requires
historyp in phase 3φ − 2, while the locking mechanism
requires historyp in phase 3φ (for unlocking).
7.4 Summary of BOTR, BLV and BL K
Table 1 summarizes the resilience (right column) and the
predicate for termination (middle column) of our three algo-
rithms BOTR, BLV and BL K . We can observe that BOTR
has the weakest predicate for termination, and the strongest
condition for resilience. BLV and BL K have the same
resilience, while BL K has a slightly stronger predicate for
termination (it requires a safe kernel in one more round).
8 Deriving the overall resilience of BLV
In this section we look at the overall resilience of the BLV
consensus algorithm together with the P fBLV predicate sim-
ulation algorithm. A similar derivation can be done for the
BOTR and BL K algorithms.
When solving consensus in the presence of (only) sta-
tic value faults (PSK ∧ P fstat ), both algorithms (BLV and
the simulation algorithm) require n > 3 f . This follows
from Theorem 4, Corollary 4 and the fact that P f,0,3cons⊕SK
implies P fBLV . However, these algorithms have different
requirements on n in the presence of dynamic value faults
(PSK ∧ P fdyn).
From Corollary 5 and the fact that P f,0,3cons⊕SK implies
P fBLV we get:
Corollary 7 If n > (β+1)(α+ f )
β−α+1 , n > α + f, α ≥ f , and
β ≥ α, then Algorithm 2 simulates P fBLV ∧ Pβdyn from
P6( f +1)+5SK ∧ Pαdyn.
From Corollary 7 for any β ≥ α, we can simulate P fBLV ∧
Pβdyn from P f,6( f +1)+5SK ∧ Pαdyn if
n >
(β + 1)(α + f )
β − α + 1 ∧ n > α + f
On the other hand, from Theorem 3 we know that we can
solve consensus with BLV under P fBLV ∧ Pβdyn if
n > 2(β + f ).
Combining these conditions and setting β = kα, where k ∈
R, k ≥ 1, we can solve consensus with Algorithm 4 and
Algorithm 2 under P f,6( f +1)+5SK ∧ Pαdyn if the following two
conditions hold:
n >
(kα + 1)(α + f )
kα − α + 1 (2)
n > 2(k − 1)α + 2(α + f ). (3)
We first consider α > 1, then α = 1.
Table 1 Summary of the three consensus algorithms BOTR, BLV and BL K
Algorithm Communication predicate for termination under Pαdyn Resilience
BOTR ∀φ,∀p, ∃φ0 > φ : CONS(2φ0 − 1) ∧ |HO(p, 2φ0 − 1)| ≥ n − f ∧ (∃φ1 ≥ φ0 : |SHO(p, 2φ1)| ≥ n − f ) n > 4α + 3 f
BLV ∀φ > 0, ∃φ0 > φ : CONS(3φ0 − 2) ∧ ∀r ∈ {3φ0 − 2, . . . , 3φ0} : |SK (r)| ≥ n − f n > 2α + 2 f
BL K ∀φ > 0, ∃φ0 > φ : CONS(3φ0 − 2) ∧ ∀r ∈ {3φ0 − 3, . . . , 3φ0} : |SK (r)| ≥ n − f n > 2α + 2 f
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Case α > 1: We can obtain different resilience bounds
depending on the choice of k.
Choosing k = 1 leads to the quadratic dependency from
Corollary 2, and is thus not what we want to achieve here.
For k ≥ 2, condition (3) implies condition (2) for any
α > 1, because kα+1kα−α+1 ≤ 2. Thus, when choosing k ≥ 2,
the smallest n is obtained with k = 2:
n > 4α + 2 f.
In case 1 < k < 2, the optimal choice of k depends on α and
f . As special case we get for k = 1.5 from condition (2),
n > 3α+2
α+2 (α + f ), i.e.,
n > 3(α + f )
while from condition (3) we get
n > 3α + 2 f
Since both conditions should hold, it follows that n > 3(α +
f ).
Case α = 1: For the special case α = 1 and f = 1, condi-
tions (3) and (2) become n > 2(k − 1) + 4 and n > 2(k+1)k .
We obtain the smallest value for n by choosing k = 1, which
leads to n > 4.
Discussion: The results show that k = 1 (i.e. β = α) leads
to the smallest value of n only when α = 1. In cases where
α > 1, a better choice is e.g. k = 1.5 (i.e. β = 1.5α). This
is a non intuitive result.
9 Direct implementation of eventual consistency using
authentication
In Sect. 6 we gave two simulations of Pcons from PSK . In
this section we show that in some systems we can get Pcons
with sufficiently high coverage without such a simulation, but
simply using authentication. Authentication has been intro-
duced very early in distributed computing research to solve
consensus. Nevertheless, people were always struggling to
give a rigorous formal definition of authentication.
The first observation is that in a transmission fault model,
the introduction of authentication makes the model in fact
benign: if every process signs its messages and upon recep-
tion only correctly signed messages are processed, no cor-
ruptions can occur. This implies that with authentication
(whatever it means) transmission faults are not able to cap-
ture Byzantine process faults. However, even if we consider
process faults, it is hard to formalize authentication in a pre-
cise manner. A possible approach to this open question is,
instead of trying define authentication, state what can be
achieved with authentication. As we will show, (eventual)
consistency is what we naturally get from authentication
assuming (eventual) synchrony.
For the clarity of the presentation, we explain how even-
tual consistency can be achieved using authentication in two
steps. In Sect. 9.1, we show how to obtain PI C from syn-
chrony and a correct leader using authentication. In Sect.
9.2, we slightly modify the algorithm of Sect. 9.1 to obtain
Pcons from eventual synchrony and eventual correct leader.
9.1 Ensuring PI C from synchrony and correct leader using
authentication
Consistency, namely P fI C (Sect. 5), can be achieved with high
probability using cryptographic signatures in a synchronous
system with f Byzantine processes (note that we are then
no more in the scope of the transmission fault model; for
a discussion for the relation between these two models see
Sect. 10). To that end, in every round that should be consis-
tent, every process signs its messages before sending it to
the (correct) leader. The leader collects all the messages it
receives and forwards them to all processes. The processes
deliver all correctly signed messages that are received from
the leader as the messages of this round. Technically this
procedure requires two “subrounds” that can be obtained in
a similar way as the normal round structure. However, the
algorithm is not a simulation as in the previous section, since
the correctness is conditional.
Assuming the (i) signatures cannot be forged, (ii) the sys-
tem is synchronous and (iii) the leader is correct, it is easy to
see that (a) all processes have the same reception vector, and
(b) all processes receive at least n − f messages. Therefore,
P fI C holds.
9.2 Ensuring Pcons from eventual synchrony and eventual
correct leader using authentication
The above leader-based procedure can be used, with a small
modification, to ensure Pcons from eventual synchrony. It is
sufficient to replace the fixed correct leader with a rotating
leader. This ensures an eventual correct leader when syn-
chrony holds. The result follows directly.
10 Communication predicates and corresponding
systems
In the HO model, there are no faulty processes and no
state corruption. Nevertheless, for predicates that character-
ize permanent faults, the model can be used to reason about
classical Byzantine faults. This implies that the algorithms in
this paper can be used also to solve consensus in the classical
Byzantine fault model. We develop this observation first for
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Table 2 Summary of consensus algorithms that tolerate arbitrary faults
Algorithm Synchrony Static and
permanent
Dynamic and
transient
Process faults Link faults Resilience
[17,22] Synchronous   n > 3 f
[28] Synchronous   n > 2la + 2
[30,31] Synchronous    n > 3 f and c > 2 f + la
OMH [5] Synchronous     n > 3 f + f ral + 2 f sl +f rl + 2 fs + 2 fo + fm
FaB Paxos [20] Partially synchronous   n > 5 f
PBFT [10] Partially synchronous   n > 3 f
DLS [12] Partially synchronous   n > 3 f
AT,E [4] Partially synchronous   n > 4α
UT,E,α [4] Partially synchronous   n > 2α
BOTR Partially synchronous     n > 3 f + 6α
BLV Partially synchronous     n > 3 f + 3α
BLK Partially synchronous     n > 3 f + 3α
The parameter f denotes the number of Byzantine faulty processes; la denotes the number of links subjected to arbitrary faults. In [30,31], the
parameter c denotes the network connectivity (value c means that there exists at least c disjoint paths between any pairs of processes). In OMH,
f ral is the number arbitrary receive link failures, f sl the number of send link failures, f rl the number of receive link failures, fs the number of
symmetrical Byzantine faulty processes, fo the number of omission faulty processes and fm the number of manifest faulty processes. The parameter
α denotes the maximum number of corrupted messages a process can receive per round
a synchronous system (for simplicity), and then extend it to
our model.12
Let S f denote a synchronous system with reliable links
and at most f Byzantine processes, and consider on the
other hand an HO machine with |SK| ≥ n − f . For cor-
rect processes, a run in S f is indistinguishable from a run
of the HO machine. Therefore, an algorithm that solves con-
sensus with |SK| ≥ n − f allows in S f correct processes
to solve consensus. Note that in S f faulty processes do not
follow the protocol. It is then natural that they do not follow
the specification of consensus.
The same indistinguishability argument can be applied
to (i) the weaker partial synchronous system [12] with at
most f Byzantine processes and (ii) the HO model with
P fstat ∧ P f,∞SK . For correct processes in the model (i), a run
is indistinguishable from a run in model (ii), and so an HO
algorithm that solves consensus allows correct processes in
the fault-prone system to solve consensus.
The predicate Pαdyn ∧ P f,kSK , α ≥ f , can correspond to
a partially synchronous system with at most f Byzantine
processes, where in addition, before stabilization time, in
every round processes can receive α− f corrupted messages
from correct processes (*). This spectrum of interpretations,
which includes permanent faults (see Sect. 4.3) contrary to
[4], shows the benefit of considering the consensus problem
in a model with (only) transmission faults.
12 This observation was made already in [19] and [4], but without giving
algorithms supporting the observation.
Further, these interpretations show that the consensus
algorithms BOTR, BLV and BL K presented in this paper
can be used in classical system models. This allows us to
compare BOTR, BLV and BL K with existing consensus
algorithms, specifically consensus algorithms that tolerate
arbitrary faults (process and/or link faults). The comparison
appears in Table 2. For BOTR, BLV and BL K , we assume
the interpretation (*) in the preceding paragraph.
11 Conclusion
The transmission fault model allows us to reason about per-
manent and transient value faults in a uniform way, which
makes the model very attractive. However, all existing solu-
tions to consensus in this model are either in the synchro-
nous system, or require strong conditions for termination that
exclude the case where all messages of a process can be cor-
rupted. The paper has shown that this limitation can be over-
come thanks to the eventual consistency predicate that states
the existence of a round where all processes receive the same
set of messages. Two simulations of eventual consistency
have been given, both from a predicate that corresponds to a
partially synchronous system parameterized with α (in every
round each process can receive up to α corrupted messages)
and f (at most f processes are corrupted). The first simula-
tion, which refers only to the parameter f , is for static faults.
The second simulation, which refers to the parameters f and
α, includes static and dynamic faults, and is compatible with
permanent and transient faults. The paper has pointed out
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two options for this second simulation: preserving or not the
number of corrupted messages in each round. The first option
requires n > (α + 1)(α + f ). The second option requires
n > η(α + f ). Combining the BLV consensus algorithm
with this second simulation leads to n > 3(α + f ) for α > 1
and n > 4 for α = 1.
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